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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The idea of constitutionally entrenched rights originated in the United 
States, and its spread throughout the world in the latter half of the 
twentieth century—both at national and supranational levels—is a 
reflection of the perceived success of American constitutionalism.  But 
while constitutional rights and judicial review have proven popular, the 
American vehicle for rights protection has not.  The U.S. Bill of Rights 
looks old and deficient compared to modern bills of rights.  Its negative 
orientation—the idea that rights are state-limiting concepts1—is widely 
regarded as either inadequate or downright harmful given more benign 
conceptions of the state, larger public sectors, and more extensive 
welfare-state policies, not to mention greater antipathy towards the 
exercise of private economic power.  Increasingly, rights are seen not 
simply as important individual interests that must be immunized against 
state interference, but as entitlements that the state must fulfill, not only 
for individuals but for groups.  The focus of the U.S. Bill of Rights on 
the civil and political rights of individuals is presumed to come at the 
expense of group economic and social rights,2 environmental rights, and 
so on—so-called second and third generation rights. 
As a result, international bills of rights like the International Covenant 
on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),3 regional bills of rights like the 
European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR),4 and domestic bills of 
rights like the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms5 and the South 
 1. For an American critique of the idea of positive rights see Frank B. Cross, The 
Error of Positive Rights, 48 UCLA L. REV. 857 (2001). 
 2. Keith Ewing’s work is typical here.  See, e.g., K.D. Ewing, The Unbalanced 
Constitution, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS 103 (Tom Campbell, K.D. Ewing 
& Adam Tomkins eds., 2001). 
 3. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, adopted Dec. 19, 1966, 
999 U.N.T.S. 171 (in force Mar. 23, 1976) [hereinafter ICCPR]. 
 4. European Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (in 
force Sept. 3, 1953) [hereinafter ECHR]. 
 5. Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982, being Schedule B to the Canada Act 1982, 
ch. 11 (U.K.) [hereinafter Canadian Charter]. 
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African Bill of Rights,6 tend to be lengthier and more specific than the 
U.S. Bill of Rights.  They may run to several pages, setting out various 
rights in detail complete with numerous subsections.  Rights that the 
U.S. Supreme Court has inferred from the text of the U.S. Bill of Rights 
are likely to be enumerated in these newer bills of rights,7 along with 
additional rights—both negative and positive in their orientation—that 
have no American counterpart.8
A further difference is that individual rights are not regarded (or at 
least presented) as unalloyed goods in other jurisdictions, and as a result 
bills of rights in these places are likely to include provisions that 
establish specific limitations on rights, and even statements of 
responsibilities.9  They may authorize and facilitate the establishment of 
 6. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2 (§§ 7-39). 
 7. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 14 (right to privacy); ICCPR, supra note 3, 
art. 17(1) (same). 
 8. See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 10 (right to human dignity); ICCPR, supra 
note 3, art. 17(1) (right to protection from unlawful attacks on honour and reputation).  
The South African Bill of Rights sets out a number of positive economic and social 
rights.  See, e.g., S. AFR. CONST. 1996 §§ 26, 27, 29 (setting forth the right to housing; 
the right to health care, food, water, and social security; and the right to education, 
respectively).  The Canadian Charter appears to be a more orthodox statement of civil 
and political rights by comparison, but the Supreme Court of Canada has suggested that 
there may be scope for its guarantees to be interpreted as establishing positive economic 
and social rights.  See Grant Huscroft, A Constitutional “Work in Progress”? The 
Charter and the Limits of Progressive Interpretation, 23 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 413, 434-37 
(2004) (Can.), reprinted in CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA 413, 434-37 (Grant 
Huscroft & Ian Brodie eds., 2004) (criticizing Gosselin v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [2002] 4 
S.C.R. 429).  Conversely, some rights set out in the U.S. Bill of Rights have no 
international counterpart, and indeed were deliberately omitted from other bills of rights.  
The Second Amendment right to bear arms is the most obvious example here.  The right 
to property is often another example. 
 9. For example, Article 19 of the ICCPR, supra note 3, sets out particular limits 
on freedom of expression, in addition to asserting that the exercise of the right carries 
with it particular responsibilities: 
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference. 
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall 
include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all 
kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form 
of art, or through any other media of his choice. 
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries 
with it special duties and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to 
certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are provided by law and 
are necessary: 
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others; 
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), 
or of public health or morals. 
Id. 




additional limitations on rights in order to ensure that the pursuit of state 
action is not stymied or unduly restricted.10  At the same time, debate 
about the extent to which rights apply or should apply to limit the power 
of private parties, as opposed to state actors, remains ongoing.11
So while the idea of rights-based constitutionalism has spread, there 
are substantial differences between the U.S. Bill of Rights and more 
modern bills of rights, differences that extend beyond degree to matters 
of kind.  The same is true of the concept of judicial review itself.  
“Strong” judicial review12—the ability of judges not only to hold 
legislation unconstitutional but to deny it legal effect—is now well 
established in the United States.  The premise once asserted so 
    Moreover, the ICCPR includes a positive obligation on states to enact hate speech 
legislation.  Id. at art. 20(2). 
Equality rights provide another good example.  Bills of rights that include an equality 
provision typically include a provision ensuring that “affirmative action” programmes are 
not found to be inconsistent.  This is not necessarily viewed as a limit on the right to 
equality, however; some such provisions are considered as an example of equality in 
action.  See Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 15(2); Lovelace v. Ontario, [2000] 1 S.C.R. 
950 (discussing section 15(2)); see also New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. 
No. 109, § 19(2); S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 9(2).  The ICCPR includes a general non-
discrimination guarantee, but is silent on affirmative action.  Nevertheless, the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee has stated that the principle of equality sometimes 
requires states to take action to redress conditions that cause or perpetuate discrimination, 
and that preferential treatment is legitimate.  See U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council (ECOSOC), 
Comm’n on Human Rights, General Comment No. 18: Non-discrimination (1989), 
reprinted in Compilation of General Comments and General Recommendations Adopted 
by Human Rights Treaty Bodies 146, U.N. Doc. HRI/GEN/1/Rev.7 (2004), available at 
http://www.ohchr.org/english/bodies/hrc/comments.htm. 
 10. The Canadian Charter is the model here.  The first provision in the Charter 
purports to guarantee the enumerated rights and freedoms, while at the same time 
providing that those rights and freedoms may be subject to “such reasonable limits 
prescribed by law as can be demonstrably justified in a free and democratic society.”  
Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 1.  Section 5 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990 is modeled on section 1 of the Canadian Charter.  New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 
1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109.    The South African Bill of Rights contains a more detailed, 
but essentially similar provision.  S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 36. 
 11. The state action doctrine remains a matter of controversy even in the United 
States.  See Stephen Gardbaum, The “Horizontal Effect” of Constitutional Rights, 102 
MICH. L. REV. 387 (2003) (proposing a new approach).  Extensive debate has occurred 
about the possible horizontal application of the United Kingdom Human Rights Act, 1998, 
c. 42.  See Ian Leigh, The UK’s Human Rights Act 1998: An Early Assessment, in 
LITIGATING RIGHTS: PERSPECTIVES FROM DOMESTIC AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 323, 336-42 
(Grant Huscroft & Paul Rishworth eds., 2002).  In Canada, the leading case is Retail, 
Wholesale & Department Store Union, Local 580 v. Dolphin Delivery Ltd., [1986] 2 S.C.R. 
573, discussed in PETER W. HOGG, 2 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 34(2)h (4th 
looseleaf ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005).  In New Zealand, see PAUL RISHWORTH, GRANT 
HUSCROFT, SCOTT OPTICAN, & RICHARD MAHONEY, THE NEW ZEALAND BILL OF 
RIGHTS 99-109 (2003).  In some countries constitutional rights apply to private as well 
as public parties.  South Africa is an example in this regard.  S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 8. 
 12. On the strong-weak dichotomy, see Mark Tushnet, Judicial Review of 
Legislation, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK OF LEGAL STUDIES 164 (Peter Cane & Mark 
Tushnet eds., 2003). 
ALLAN-HUSCROFT.DOC 4/20/2006  8:27 AM 
[VOL. 43:  1, 2006]  Constitutional Rights Coming Home to Roost? 
  SAN DIEGO LAW REVIEW 
 5 
 
controversially by Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison—“It is, 
emphatically, the province and duty of the judicial department, to say 
what the law is”13—is now taken for granted.  Yet the spread of bills of 
rights (even bills of rights that are broader in scope than the U.S. model) 
has not always been accompanied by the spread of strong judicial 
review.  A weaker form of judicial review exists in countries like the 
United Kingdom and New Zealand, where judges are specifically 
precluded from “striking down” legislation on the basis of inconsistency 
with protected rights.  Canadian judges have greater power.  They may 
“strike down” legislation they find to be inconsistent with protected 
rights, but in theory they do not have the last word: provincial 
legislatures and the Federal Parliament can, to a limited extent, legislate 
“notwithstanding” Charter rights.14
Whether judicial review is characterized as strong or weak, or even 
something in between, there are important differences in the bodies of 
case law that different bills of rights have spawned.  The vast body of 
law developed by the U.S. Supreme Court in interpreting the U.S. Bill of 
Rights was once prominent in the decisions of foreign courts and 
international tribunals charged with interpreting bills of rights.  
Increasingly, however, it seems less relevant.15  In some ways this was 
an inevitable development; constitutional rights may have American 
 13. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137, 176 (1803).  Cf. Randy E. Barnett, The Original 
Meaning of the Judicial Power (Boston Univ. Sch. of Law Working Paper Series, Pub. 
Law & Legal Theory Working Paper No. 03-18, 2003), available at http://ssrn. 
com/abstract=437040. 
 14. The Canadian Charter allows ordinary legislation to be passed 
“notwithstanding” most, but not all Charter rights, but only for five-year, renewable 
terms.  Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 33.  The notwithstanding clause does not apply 
retroactively.  Ford v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712, 788.  The impact of the 
notwithstanding clause is widely misunderstood and its effects exaggerated.  In our view 
the Canadian setup, in practice, mimics the United States in giving the judges the last 
word.  See infra text accompanying note 72. 
 15. The use of American authority in Canadian courts, where it might be expected 
to be most relevant, has decreased as the body of Charter case law has grown.  See Claire 
L’Heureux-Dubé, The Importance of Dialogue: Globalization and the International 
Impact of the Rehnquist Court, 34 TULSA L.J. 15, 29-30 (1998) (tying the diminished 
authority of American law in Canada and in other countries to the Rehnquist Court).  
Early in the life of the Charter, the Supreme Court of Canada warned against “drawing 
too ready a parallel between constitutions born to different countries in different ages 
and in very different circumstances . . . .”  Rahey v. The Queen, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 588, 
639 (La Forest, J.); see also PETER W. HOGG, 1 CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF CANADA § 3.5 
(4th looseleaf ed. 1997 & Supp. 2005). 




parents, but children outgrow their parents and go their own way.16  The 
question we pose is, should the children be welcomed home?  To what 
extent, if any, should American courts heed the rights jurisprudence of 
foreign courts and international tribunals? 
There is no doubt that internationalism, as we will call it, is the order 
of the day in many courts.17  However, there is a significant difference: 
modern bills of rights may permit, if not require, consideration of the 
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals.  The New 
Zealand Bill of Rights is an example of the permissive approach.  Its 
preamble affirms New Zealand’s commitment to the ICCPR, and the 
similarity of its provisions to those of the Canadian Charter of Rights 
and Freedoms was intended to make Canadian precedents relevant in 
New Zealand.18  The South African Bill of Rights is an example of the 
mandatory approach.  It specifically instructs South African courts to 
have regard to international law in interpreting it, while making clear 
that reference to foreign law is permissible.19  The United Kingdom 
Human Rights Act is another example of the mandatory approach. 
Among other things, it specifically requires courts in the United 
Kingdom to take into account the decisions and advisory opinions of the 
European Court of Human Rights interpreting the ECHR.20
No such authorization or instruction is found in the U.S. Bill of 
Rights, and until recently the U.S. Supreme Court has generally been 
dismissive of the human rights jurisprudence of foreign courts and 
 16. The rights as children metaphor was used by Judge Guido Calabresi in his 
concurring opinion in United States v. Then, 56 F.3d 464, 469 (2d Cir. 1995) (“Wise 
parents do not hesitate to learn from their children.”). 
 17. Countries that once turned to England for guidance in the development of the 
common law and constitutional law began to look beyond the United Kingdom for 
influences once ties to the English legal system, and in particular the formal authority of 
the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council, began to wane and ultimately ceased.  See 
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 15, at 17-21.  The Judicial Committee of the Privy Council 
was the highest court in Canada until 1949; in Australia, Privy Council jurisdiction 
remained in limited form until 1986, and in New Zealand until 2004.  On the abolition of 
Privy Council appeals, see HOGG, supra note 15, § 8.2. 
 18. In its White Paper proposing the New Zealand Bill of Rights, the Government 
noted that “reference to the International Covenant in the preamble will open the way for 
the courts to refer to the Covenant in interpreting and applying the Bill.”  MINISTRY OF 
JUSTICE, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR NEW ZEALAND: A WHITE PAPER, 1985, A.J.H.R. A.6 § 
10.13 [hereinafter White Paper].  Moreover, it is clear from the White Paper that many 
important decisions in the drafting of the New Zealand Bill of Rights were made in order 
to facilitate the importation of case law from foreign courts.  One reason proffered for 
adopting a general reasonable limits provision based on the Canadian Charter was that 
“New Zealand courts will be able, in this respect as in others, to take advantage of the 
developing jurisprudence of the Canadian courts” Id. at § 10.26(e). 
 19. S. AFR. CONST. 1996 § 39(1). 
 20. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 § 2(1). 
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international tribunals, if it has noticed it at all.21  Of course, foreign and 
international developments have not been ignored completely. In 
Furman v. Georgia,22 for example, some members of the Court canvassed 
legislative developments in Canada and the United Kingdom abolishing 
capital punishment in discussing the requirements of the Eighth 
Amendment.23  Likewise, sporadic reference to foreign legislation and 
case law can be found in various other cases—and not always by 
proponents of internationalism24—but it could not be said to have had 
any significant influence on their outcomes. 
This appears to be changing at least for some of the Justices of the 
U.S. Supreme Court.  The most significant use of foreign authority by 
the Supreme Court occurs in recent controversial cases such as 
Lawrence v. Texas25 and Roper v. Simmons,26 both of which involve 
changes in constitutional law, and both of which reveal deep divisions 
within the Court as to the relevance and legitimacy of the use of foreign 
authority.  In Lawrence, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court cites 
decisions of the European Court of Human Rights27 in contradicting a 
 21. Sujit Choudhry, Globalization in Search of Justification: Toward a Theory of 
Comparative Constitutional Interpretation, 74 IND. L.J. 819, 832 (1999) (describing the 
unwillingness of American courts to consider foreign jurisprudence as reflecting “an 
attitude of legal hegemony”). 
 22. 408 U.S. 238 (1972). 
 23. Id.; see also Thompson v. Oklahoma, 487 U.S. 815, 830-31 (1988) (citing the 
laws of several countries in regard to the death penalty and juvenile offenders). 
 24. See, for example, Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, 
505 U.S. 833, 945 n.1 (1992), in which Chief Justice Rehnquist cites and contrasts 
Canadian and West German decisions on the constitutionality of abortion regulation in 
his dissenting opinion.  The Chief Justice cites case law and legislative developments in 
making the point that assisted suicide is an issue in a number of countries in Washington 
v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 718 n.16 (1997).  In Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 
(2003), Justice Ginsburg’s concurring opinion, with which Justice Breyer joined, 
referred to the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial 
Discrimination, which the United States has ratified, and the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, which it has not, in making 
the point that the Court’s approach to affirmative action (allowing it, subject to an end 
point) was in accordance with the international standards they established.  Bollinger, 
539 U.S. at 344.  See infra notes 52-53 and accompanying text (discussing the 
Conventions). 
 25. 539 U.S. 558 (2003). 
 26. 543 U.S. 551 (2005). 
 27. The Court cited Dudgeon v. United Kingdom, 1981 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 
444, to demonstrate that the claimed right to engage in private homosexual conduct was 
not insubstantial in Western civilization.  Kennedy writes: 
To the extent Bowers relied on values we share with a wider civilization, it 
should be noted that the reasoning and holding in Bowers have been rejected 




central holding of Bowers v. Hardwick,28 which the Court overruled.  
Among other things, Justice Kennedy’s opinion for the Court in Roper 
refers to the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child, the 
ICCPR, and the abolition of the death penalty in the United Kingdom 
and in countries that once executed juveniles in concluding that the 
Eighth Amendment precludes the execution of juveniles.29  Justice 
Kennedy notes that the “overwhelming weight of international opinion 
[is] against the juvenile death penalty . . . .”30
The debate has continued outside the parameters of the Court’s 
constitutional decisions.  Justices Breyer and Ginsburg have gone out of 
their way to promote the use of foreign authority on several occasions.31  
The unprecedented public debate between Justices Scalia and Breyer in 
2005 is further proof of the importance of the unfolding controversy.32
elsewhere. The European Court of Human Rights has followed not Bowers but 
its own decision in Dudgeon v United Kingdom.  See P.G. & J.H. v. United 
Kingdom, App. No. 00044787/98, ¶ 56 (Eur. Ct. H. R., Sept. 25, 2001); 
Modinos v. Cyprus, 259 Eur. Ct. H. R. (1993); Norris v. Ireland, 142 Eur. Ct. 
H. R. (1988). Other nations, too, have taken action consistent with an 
affirmation of the protected right of homosexual adults to engage in intimate, 
consensual conduct. See Brief for Mary Robinson et al. as Amici Curiae 11-12. 
The right the petitioners seek in this case has been accepted as an integral part 
of human freedom in many other countries. There has been no showing that in 
this country the governmental interest in circumscribing personal choice is 
somehow more legitimate or urgent. 
Lawrence, 539 U.S. at 576-77. 
 28. 478 U.S. 186 (1986). 
 29. Roper, 543 U.S. at 576; Convention on the Rights of the Child art. 37, adopted 
Nov. 20, 1989, 1577 U.N.T.S. 43, 55. 
 30. Roper, 543 U.S. at 578.  Justice Kennedy describes world opinion as not 
controlling, but rather as providing respected and significant confirmation of the Court’s 
conclusion.  Justice O’Connor criticizes the Court’s result, noting that “evidence of an 
international consensus does not alter my determination that the Eighth Amendment does 
not, at this time, forbid capital punishment of 17-year-old murderers in all cases.”  Id. at 
604 (O’Connor, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).  At the same time, however, she 
repudiates Justice Scalia’s view that foreign and international precedents have no place 
in Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.  Id.  As Justice Scalia puts it: “the basic premise of 
the Court’s argument—that American law should conform to the laws of the rest of the 
world—ought to be rejected out of hand.”  Id. at 624 (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 31. See, e.g., Stephen Breyer, Keynote Address to American Society of 
International Law (Apr. 4, 2003), in 97 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 265 (2003); Ruth 
Bader Ginsburg, “A Decent Respect to the Opinions of [Human]kind”: The Value of a 
Comparative Perspective in Constitutional Adjudication, Keynote Address to the 
American Society of International Law (Apr. 1, 2005), in 99 AM. SOC’Y INT’L L. PROC. 
(forthcoming Jan. 2006), available at http://www.asil.org/events/AM05/ginsburg050401. 
html; An Open Discussion with Justice Ruth Bader Ginsburg, 36 CONN. L. REV. 1033, 
1040-42 (2004). 
 32. See Antonin Scalia & Stephen Breyer, The Relevance of Foreign Legal 
Materials in U.S. Constitutional Cases, A Conversation Before the U.S. Association of 
Constitutional Law (Jan. 13, 2005), in 3 INT’L J. CONST. L. 519 (2005). 
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Despite these developments, in our view the use of foreign and 
international law in interpreting the U.S. Bill of Rights is for the most 
part undertheorized.33  Nor has the U.S. Supreme Court justified or 
explained the use of foreign materials in the few cases in which they are 
cited.  Even Sanford Levinson, who describes himself as someone who 
identifies with “cosmopolitanism” rather than “parochialism,”34 says of 
the Court: 
To be sure, they cite foreign materials, especially when they are in accordance 
with what one suspects are pre-existing views. What seems strikingly lacking, 
though, is any real analysis of them or explanation, beyond the ostensible force 
provided by their very existence, of why we should be impressed by them.35
For many proponents, the case for rights-based internationalism in 
American courts is self-evident, and requires no justification. We 
disagree. 
To put it bluntly, what is added to the persuasiveness of a rights-based 
argument in an American court by indicating that a similar argument 
based on a different bill of rights has been accepted by a foreign court or 
international tribunal?  It seems that just about any argument about 
rights can already be made in an American court.  Nothing precludes one 
from making a novel or unusual argument.  Hence the point of invoking 
international authority is not simply to allow new arguments to be made; 
rather, it is an attempt to confer some sort of higher status on an 
argument, and so a greater level of persuasiveness than it would 
otherwise have.  Moreover, this increased persuasiveness is supposed to 
follow simply because a similar argument has been accepted elsewhere.  
This raises another question: What is it about foreign judges and 
members of international tribunals that makes their views on rights 
questions presumptively persuasive?  Why might one think their views 
on moral questions are better than those of American voters, legislators, 
and judges? 
 33. For more general treatments of internationalism, see Choudhry, supra note 21; 
Sarah K. Harding, Comparative Reasoning and Judicial Review, 28 YALE J. INT’L. L. 
409 (2003); Christopher McCrudden, A Common Law of Human Rights?: Transnational 
Judicial Conversations on Constitutional Rights, 20 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 499 (2000); 
Anne-Marie Slaughter, A Global Community of Courts, 44 HARV. INT’L L.J. 191 (2003). 
 34. Sanford Levinson, Looking Abroad when Interpreting the U.S. Constitution: 
Some Reflections, 39 TEX. INT’L L.J. 353, 363 (2004).  Levinson adds: “I am no fan of 
Justice Scalia.  I find his militant provincialism embarrassing; I much prefer the 
cosmopolitanism expressed by the Canadian justices and by Justice Breyer.”  Id. at 358. 
 35. Id. at 362. 




The unspoken premise need not be that internationalism leads to 
better answers; rather, it might just be that internationalism facilitates 
different answers, and so may help to mitigate some of the more 
conservative strictures of the Court’s doctrine.  The decisions of 
foreign courts and international tribunals are increasingly more 
politically liberal than those of their American counterparts, and hence 
more to the liking of rights-claimants.  The President of the American 
Civil Liberties Union, Professor Nadine Strossen, is surprisingly 
candid in advocating the use of foreign authority in interpreting the 
U.S. Bill of Rights on this basis: 
   In the ACLU’s ideal world, all individual rights would receive the maximum 
protection consistent with civil libertarian principles, and, in support of our 
claims for each right, we would cite whatever source of legal authority offered 
the most protection—not only the US Constitution, but also, alternatively, state 
constitutions, federal or state statutes, or international human rights principles. 
This is an upward-ratcheting approach. In other words, the US Constitution—as 
interpreted by the Supreme Court—sets a floor under our individual rights, but 
it should not set up a ceiling over them. 
   Under this civil libertarian approach, to the extent that increased protection for 
individual rights is offered by other binding legal authorities, domestic or 
international, they should prevail over US constitutional law. In contrast, 
though, whenever these other authorities purport to undermine rights protected 
by the US Constitution, the Constitution trumps them. In the same vein, we 
believe that government officials should respect fundamental rights even if they 
are not expressly articulated in any constitution, treaty, or any other explicit 
source of law.36
Leave aside the obvious rejoinder that people disagree about how 
rights ought to play out, and about what is their “maximum protection 
consistent with civil libertarian principles.”  A further initial, preliminary 
response to such views as Professor Strossen articulates is that 
comparative rights-based work is difficult at the best of times, and the 
difficulty increases as the interpretive enterprise broadens.  Constraints 
exist of both a practical and subjective nature. Practical constraints 
include limits not only on the expertise of counsel (not to mention limits 
on clients’ ability to pay for this sort of work), but also on the expertise 
of courts, even assuming their openness to internationalism.37  So where 
 36. Nadine Strossen, Liberty and Equality: Complementary, Not Competing, 
Constitutional Commitments, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 149, 153 
(footnotes omitted). 
 37. Justice Claire L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of Canada once 
lamented that although Canadian law is cited by courts in countries like Zimbabwe, 
South Africa, and Israel, litigants in the Supreme Court of Canada “do not put [cases 
from these countries] before us as often as they should.”  L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 
15, at 27.  The reference to Zimbabwe stands out like a sore thumb, but it is not the first 
time that country’s jurisprudence has been invoked by a judge promoting 
internationalism: Justice Breyer acknowledged that he “may have made what one might 
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does internationalism begin and end?  The answer is that the limits on 
internationalism are likely to coincide with the normative preferences of 
the party advancing the international perspective.  Counsel are likely to 
cite the decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals that favour 
their position rather than participating in the sort of global rights 
dialogue some romanticize.38
Thus, even courts open to internationalism are unlikely to have a 
complete picture put before them.  More likely, they will have a 
snapshot of a particular aspect of law from a few countries, which may 
or may not be representative of the array of international approaches on 
offer.  Those countries are more likely to have common law legal 
systems than civilian; more likely to be English-speaking than any other 
language; more likely to be European than Asian; and so on.  Numerous 
political factors may be relevant when proffering foreign law.  Likewise, 
it would be most surprising if even courts otherwise open to 
internationalism were not selective about the jurisprudence they were 
willing to take into account.  As Fred Schauer has hypothesized: 
The political reputation of the donor country, both internationally and in the 
recipient country, is a causal factor in determining the degree of reception in the 
recipient country of the donor country’s legal ideas, norms, and institutions, 
even holding constant the host country’s evaluation of the intrinsic legal worth 
of those ideas, norms, and institutions, and even holding constant the actual 
legal worth of those ideas, norms, and institutions.39
In other words, other than predicting that there will be few citations of 
Zimbabwean authority, it is difficult to be more specific.40  Courts 
call a tactical error in referring to a case from Zimbabwe—not the human rights capital 
of the world.” Scalia & Breyer, supra note 32, at 528. 
 38. Of course courts may well ask clerks to research the decisions of foreign courts 
and international tribunals, but this poses its own difficulties, quite apart from the 
problems of legitimacy that arise when courts consider material not put before them by 
counsel.  Presumably once courts demonstrate an interest in particular case law, counsel 
will do their best to oblige.  On the notion of “dialogue,” see infra Part III.F. 
 39. Frederick Schauer, The Politics and Incentives of Legal Transplantation, in 
GOVERNANCE IN A GLOBALIZING WORLD 253, 258 (Joseph S. Nye, Jr. & John D. Donahue 
eds., 2000). 
 40. Schauer speculates on the reasons why the decisions of some countries may be 
more likely than others to be influential internationally.  Id. at 258-61.  In addition to the 
reasons he proffers, it is fair to say that courts are more likely to be apprised of the 
decisions of a foreign court when counsel are comfortable with the law of the relevant 
jurisdiction.  The movement of lawyers and the international experience they bring with 
them makes them more likely to be conversant in more than one legal system than in the 
past. 




receptive to internationalism do not explain why they cite particular 
authority in particular circumstances, still less do they say why that 
authority should be preferred to authority that is not canvassed—authority 
that may be quite different.41
That initial, preliminary response notwithstanding, we emphasize that 
our concern is not with internationalism per se, but with internationalism 
in American courts.  There is no doubt that that there is increasing 
pressure on U.S. courts (not least from legal academics) to accept the 
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals as relevant, if not 
persuasive authority in interpreting the U.S. Bill of Rights.42  American 
courts are accused of being old-fashioned, if not parochial; of failing to 
understand that human rights are a global concern; and of failing to 
appreciate that state-based conceptions of human rights are inadequate, 
if not incoherent.  With so many courts and tribunals in the rights 
business, why not benefit from their experience?  Why not welcome the 
children home? 
The answer, we suggest, is that international rights jurisprudence has 
less in common with American law than is usually assumed.  The 
children have changed significantly since they left home.  Foreign courts 
and international tribunals speak the same language of rights, but they 
have different understandings of what rights are, and how they are to be 
understood.  Not just that, but conceptions of the state and its role, and 
the role of courts, differ widely.  Many countries have a conception of 
democracy that is far less majoritarian, and far less concerned with 
institutional checks and balances than the American model.  The very 
basics of American constitutionalism are, in important ways, foreign to 
many of the jurisdictions that have adopted bills of rights. 
These differences are important to those who are concerned with the 
countermajoritarian difficulty,43 where the fear is of unelected judges 
interpreting vague, amorphous rights guarantees so as to frustrate the 
will of the elected representatives of the people.  However, they matter 
even to those who are relatively unconcerned or sanguine about 
 41. McCrudden, supra note 33, at 515-16, argues not only that judges should cite 
international authority that they have relied on, but also that the criteria they used to 
determine which international decisions they relied on should be acknowledged. 
 42. Pressure to do so also comes from the judges of foreign courts.  See, e.g., 
Aharon Barak, Foreword: A Judge on Judging: The Role of a Supreme Court in a 
Democracy, 116 HARV. L. REV. 16 (2002) (regretting the U.S. Supreme Court’s historic 
unwillingness to consider foreign authority); Gérard V. La Forest, The Use of American 
Precedents in Canadian Courts, 46 ME. L. REV. 211 (1994) (suggesting that America 
could benefit from considering the decisions of Canadian courts); L’Heureux-Dubé, 
supra note 15, at 39-40 (lamenting the failure of the Rehnquist Court to consider 
Canadian precedents (among other things)). 
 43. ALEXANDER BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME COURT 
AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 16 (2d ed. 1986). 
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American judges using the American Bill of Rights to gainsay American 
legislators.  Gainsaying the decisions of American legislators on the 
basis of the decisions of foreign courts or international tribunals is 
harder to justify; it can call in aid a smaller (and in our view less 
convincing) set of possible justifications for overriding the will of the 
elected representatives of the people. 
In this article we argue that internationalism poses significant 
challenges for American constitutionalism that have not adequately been 
acknowledged by its promoters. 
Our argument will come in three parts.  In the first part, we will set out 
some of the main features of human rights jurisprudence in other 
countries with bills of rights and under international law, highlighting 
those features that distinguish it from American law. 
In the second part of this article we will consider the main arguments 
employed to justify and defend the power exercised by judges under 
bills of rights-style instruments.  We will indicate which of those 
justifications we think are potentially applicable when a domestic bill of 
rights is the source of the judges’ power.  Likewise, we will indicate 
which of those justifications we think are potentially applicable when it 
is the decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals that are 
being raised (and in some sense relied upon) to justify the exercise of 
judicial power.  Our conclusion will be that in the latter case the 
potential justifications are fewer. 
In the third and final part of this article, we will look at recent case 
law from Canada, New Zealand, and the United Kingdom and indicate 
what may lie in store if internationalism becomes commonplace in 
American courts.  We will argue that there has been a noticeable, and in 
our view undesirable, ratcheting-up effect in the rights-based 
jurisprudence of these common law legal systems as each draws on the 
most expansive case law of the others.  It is the importation of this 
jurisprudence—a jurisprudence based on a similar abstract rights 
language but different concrete understandings and constitutional 
premises—that in our view raises concerns for American constitutionalism, 
concerns that cannot easily (if at all) be assuaged.  Nor can such a 
practice easily be justified.  It cannot easily be justified by those who 
think the right of all to participate in social decisionmaking lies at the 
heart of democracy and needs protecting; more tellingly, it cannot easily 
be justified even by those who support judicial review under a domestic 
bill of rights. 




II.  PART I—THE SPREAD OF RIGHTS-BASED CONSTITUTIONALISM 
A.  Post WWII Developments 
Consider the number of international human rights instruments to 
which most democracies—and not just democracies—have acceded 
since the end of World War II.  The main three, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)44 and the two covenants it 
spawned, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural 
Rights (ICESCR),45 and the ICCPR, are often referred to as the 
International Bill of Rights.  The UDHR is a statement of aspirations, 
but it nevertheless sets the tone for the adoption of the latter two treaties, 
which include dozens of rights that are prescribed in one form or 
another.  These span from basic protections (such as the right to life,46 or 
to liberty and security of the person47), to somewhat vaguer entitlements 
(such as the economic, social, and cultural rights said to be indispensable 
for one’s dignity and the free development of one’s personality48), to 
rights that for many people in the world are best described as “wishful 
thinking” (such as the right to rest and leisure,49 or the right to a standard 
of living adequate for the health and well being of oneself and his or her 
family, including food, clothing, housing, medical care, and necessary 
social services50).  And that is just to mention the main international 
human rights instruments.51  A variety of specific international treaties 
address such things as racial discrimination,52 discrimination against 
 44. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A, U.N. GAOR, 3d 
Sess., 1st plen. mtg., U.N. Doc. A/810 (Dec. 12, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR]. 
 45. International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 
1966, 993 U.N.T.S. 3 (in force Jan. 3, 1976) [hereinafter ICESCR]. 
 46. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 6. 
 47. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 3; ICCPR, supra note 3, art. 9(1). 
 48. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 22; ICESCR, supra note 45, arts. 9, 15. 
 49. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 24; ICESCR, supra note 45, art. 7(d). 
 50. UDHR, supra note 44, art. 25(1); ICESCR, supra note 45, art. 11(1). 
 51. On international human rights generally, see A.H. ROBERTSON & J.G. 
MERRILLS, HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE WORLD (4th ed. 1996).  On the ICCPR, see ALEX 
CONTE, SCOTT DAVIDSON & RICHARD BURCHILL, DEFINING CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: 
THE JURISPRUDENCE OF THE UNITED NATIONS HUMAN RIGHTS COMMITTEE (2004), and 
SARAH JOSEPH, JENNY SCHULTZ & MELISSA CASTAN, THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON 
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS: CASES, MATERIAL, AND COMMENTARY (2d ed. 2004). 
 52. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, opened 
for signature Mar. 7, 1966, 660 U.N.T.S. 195. 
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women,53 and so on—some, but not all of which the United States has 
acceded to in whole or in part.54
A more complete account of the International Bill of Rights would go 
on to clarify that the rights protected by the ICCPR were meant to be 
realized by signatory states immediately, while those protected by the 
ICESCR were meant to be realized progressively.  It would go on to 
explain the reporting obligation on member states and the subsequent 
establishment of an optional protocol that allows individuals to bring 
complaints against their states for violating the ICCPR to the United 
Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC), an enforcement 
mechanism that supplements the obligations those states owe to one 
another.55  However, for our purposes we do not need to paint such a 
complete account.  We want only to trace the main features of 
international rights jurisprudence and to show its effect on other 
common law legal systems. 
Recall that it was only in the last half of the twentieth century, and 
more particularly in the last two or three decades, that rights-based 
constitutionalism was widely adopted elsewhere.  Recall, too, that the 
U.S. Bill of Rights led by example, though the International Bill of 
Rights has also provided inspiration for the adoption of bills of rights in 
 53. Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against 
Women, adopted Dec. 18, 1979, 1249 U.N.T.S. 13; Optional Protocol to the Convention 
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, G.A. Res. 54/4, 
Annex, U.N. DOC. A/Res/54/4/Annex (Oct. 15, 1999). 
 54. Proponents of international human rights are fond of pointing out that the 
United States is one of only two countries (the other being Somalia) that have signed, but 
never ratified, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, supra note 29.  Indeed, Justice 
Ginsburg has lamented that the United States has not yet ratified the Convention on the 
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women, supra note 53.  Ginsburg, 
supra note 31 (“sadly, the United States has not yet ratified”).  The anodyne nature of 
these sorts of treaties facilitates the criticism: How could anyone be against concepts like 
the best interests of children?  The problem, of course, is that these sorts of terms come 
to mean very different things in a variety of contexts when interpreted by the expert 
bodies that oversee the treaties, not to mention the domestic courts that may rely on them 
to reshape national law.  In Australia, see Minister of State for Immigration and Ethnic 
Affairs v. Teoh, (1995) 183 C.L.R. 273; in Canada, see Baker v. Minister of Citizenship 
& Immigration, [1999] 2 S.C.R. 817, both involving deportation decisions. 
 55. On the legal significance of decisions of the UNHRC, see Scott Davidson, 
Intention and Effect: The Legal Status of the Final Views of the Human Rights 
Committee, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 305, and Elizabeth Evatt, The 
Impact of International Human Rights on Domestic Law, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra 
note 11, at 281. 




many countries.56  Canada entrenched its Charter of Rights and 
Freedoms as part of a massive package of constitutional reform in 
1982;57 New Zealand enacted the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act,58 a 
statutory bill of rights, in 1990; South Africa entrenched its Constitution, 
which includes a bill of rights, in 1996;59 and in 1998 the United 
Kingdom enacted the United Kingdom Human Rights Act, a statutory 
bill of rights that incorporates the ECHR into domestic law.60  Save for 
Australia, where there is still no bill of rights at the Commonwealth or 
State level,61 rights-based constitutionalism has become a defining 
 56. The UNHRC has on several occasions expressed the view that accession to the 
ICCPR entails the obligation to adopt a bill of rights.  The Committee’s view is usually 
expressed in terms of regret.  For example, the Committee has expressed regret that New 
Zealand adopted a statutory bill of rights rather than a constitutional model, and that its 
bill of rights precludes judges from striking down legislation, as discussed infra Part 
II.B.2.  See U.N. General Assembly, Human Rights Committee, Concluding 
Observations of the Human Rights Committee: New Zealand 03/10/1995, U.N. DOC. 
CCPR/C/79/Add. 47; A/50/40, paras. 166-91 (Oct. 3, 1995).  This view that the ICCPR 
requires the adoption of a bill of rights, or any particular bill of rights, is plainly 
erroneous.  The ICCPR requires that the rights it protects be observed by member states, 
but the way in which a country complies with the ICCPR is a matter for that country to 
determine.  Rights may be protected by legislation and common law, among other things.  
See Janet McLean, Legislative Invalidation, Human Rights Protection and s 4 of the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights Act, 4 N.Z. L. REV. 421 (2001) (answering the UNHRC’s criticism 
of New Zealand); see also Matadeen v. Pointu (1999) 1 A.C. 98 (P.C.) (appeal taken 
from Mauritius). 
 57. Passage of the Canada Act 1982 by the U.K. Parliament, often referred to as 
the patriation of the Canadian Constitution, established a domestic amending formula, 
whereas prior to 1982 formal amendments to the Canadian Constitution had to be 
approved by the U.K. Parliament.  See HOGG, supra note 15, §§ 1.3-1.4.  A number of 
amendments to the Canadian Constitution were effected by the Canada Act in 1982, the 
most significant being the inclusion of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, the 
first thirty-four provisions of the Canada Act 1982.  See Canadian Charter, supra note 5.  
Prior to the adoption of the Charter, Canada had a statutory bill of rights at the federal 
level.  The Canadian Bill of Rights 1960 is now largely redundant, although it is 
noteworthy that this Act includes a right to the protection of property that the Charter 
does not, along with additional procedural due process protections, and so may 
supplement Charter protections against the federal government in some contexts.   
 58. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109. 
 59. See S. AFR. CONST. 1996 ch. 2 and supra text accompanying note 6. 
 60. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42 § 2. 
 61. In 2004 the Australian Capital City of Canberra, which is known as the ACT 
or Australian Capital Territory (not a part of any of the Australian States, its status being 
akin to that of the District of Columbia), enacted a statutory bill of rights.  There is, of 
course, ongoing academic interest in the adoption of a bill of rights.  See, e.g., GEORGE 
WILLIAMS, A BILL OF RIGHTS FOR AUSTRALIA (2000).  On the other hand, there are strong 
antipodean opponents of bills of rights.  See, e.g., JEFFREY GOLDSWORTHY, THE 
SOVEREIGNTY OF PARLIAMENT (1999); James Allan, A Defence of the Status Quo, in 
PROTECTING HUMAN RIGHTS: INSTRUMENTS AND INSTITUTIONS 175 (Tom Campbell, Jeffrey 
Goldsworthy & Adrienne Stone eds., 2003); Tom Campbell, Judicial Activism—Justice or 
Treason?, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 307 (2003).  The State of Victoria appointed a Committee to 
investigate the adoption of a statutory bill of rights in 2005, led by Professor Williams.  
Professor Williams’s committee issued a report in January 2006 recommending the 
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feature of most English-speaking common law legal systems, and many 
other legal systems as well. 
B. How Other Bills of Rights Work 
In order to see how bills of rights work in other countries, let us 
consider the experience of Canada, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom, three common law countries that have recently adopted bills 
of rights. 
1.  Canada 
As we noted, Canada has an entrenched bill of rights that includes a 
detailed list of rights and freedoms.  Two main features distinguish the 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms (Charter) from the U.S. Bill 
of Rights.  First, the Charter includes an explicit abridging provision, 
section 1, which guarantees the enumerated rights and freedoms but at 
the same time declares that those rights and freedoms are subject to 
reasonable limits.  Thus, legislation is consistent with the Charter if the 
limits it imposes on rights are considered reasonable and justified in a 
free and democratic society.62
Some Canadian commentators argue that this feature makes rights 
adjudication under the Charter qualitatively different than under the U.S. 
Bill of Rights.63  The Charter, they say, does not protect rights 
absolutely, the suggestion being that the U.S. Bill of Rights does.  In our 
view this reflects a basic misunderstanding.64  The difference between 
rights adjudication in the two countries is that rights adjudication is 
broken down into a two-step process under the Canadian Charter, 
whereas under the U.S. Bill of Rights the two steps are merged.  Under 
adoption of a state bill of rights.  STATE OF VICTORIA, DEPT. OF JUSTICE, RIGHTS, 
RESPONSIBILITIES AND RESPECT: THE REPORT OF THE HUMAN RIGHTS CONSULTATION 
COMMITTEE (2005), available at http://www.justice.vic.gov.au/CA256902000FE154/ 
Lookup/HR_Report/$file/HumanRightsFinal_FULL.pdf. 
 62. Section 1 of the Canadian Charter, supra note 5, provides as follows: “The 
Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms guarantees the rights and freedoms set out in 
it subject only to such reasonable limits prescribed by law as can be demonstrably 
justified in a free and democratic society.” 
 63. See, e.g., KENT ROACH, THE SUPREME COURT ON TRIAL: JUDICIAL ACTIVISM OR 
DEMOCRATIC DIALOGUE (2001) (Can.). 
 64. See James Allan, The Author Doth Protest Too Much, Methinks, 20 N.Z. U. L. 
REV. 519 (2003); Mark Tushnet, Judicial Activism or Restraint in a Section 33 World, 53 
U. TORONTO L.J. 89 (2003) (both reviewing ROACH, supra note 63). 




the Charter, rights are defined without regard to the justification for 
limiting them.  As a result, it may be meaningless to speak of rights in 
Canada without taking into account the justifiability of particular 
limitations.  In contrast, to say that someone has a right under the U.S. 
Bill of Rights is to make the stronger claim that there is no justification 
for limiting an individual’s freedom.  The Canadian two-step process 
allows judges to define rights generously, because the real work comes 
at the justificatory enquiry that follows.  The difference is largely one of 
form rather than substance.  The leading Canadian case delineating the 
scope of permissible limitations on Charter rights, R. v. Oakes,65 
establishes a proportionality test with which American courts have long 
been familiar.66
In neither country, then, are rights generally treated as absolutes.67  
The real question is the extent to which limitations are upheld by the 
highest courts in the two countries, and there is no doubt that the 
Supreme Court of Canada has reached results different, if not opposite, 
to those reached by the U.S. Supreme Court in a number of comparable 
leading cases.  For example, the Supreme Court of Canada has, like the 
U.S. Supreme Court, held that the freedom of expression protects speech 
without regard to its content.68  However, this holding is not equivalent 
to the meaningful “content neutrality” idea in First Amendment law.  In 
Canada, content neutrality means only that expression enjoys prima facie 
constitutional protection regardless of its content.  Anything with 
expressive content is, in other words, within the ambit of the protected 
freedom, and the state must justify the establishment of limits upon the 
freedom of expression.  At the justificatory stage, however, the content 
of expression is relevant not only to the state’s reasons for establishing 
limits upon it, but to the extent to which particular limits can be justified.  
 65. [1986] 1 S.C.R. 103.  See generally HOGG, supra note 11, § 35. 
 66. Compare the test under Oakes, [1986] 1 S.C.R. at 138-39, with the test set out 
by the U.S. Supreme Court for evaluating limitations on commercial speech in Central 
Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Commission, 447 U.S. 557, 564 (1980). 
 67. The Supreme Court of Canada has often asserted that all rights are subject to 
the reasonable limits clause in the Charter, see, e.g., R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45, 95, 
but this appears to us to be an overstatement.  As a practical matter, some rights are 
treated as absolutes.  For example, it is inconceivable that a Canadian court would 
conclude that legislation infringing the right not to be subject to cruel or unusual 
treatment or punishment, Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 12, is justified.  A court 
minded to uphold treatment or punishment in difficult circumstances would likely 
conclude that the right had not been breached.  Accord HOGG, supra note 11, § 35.14(f). 
 68. Irwin Toy Ltd. v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [1989] 1 S.C.R. 927; see also R. v. 
Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452 (protecting pornography); R. v. Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. 
697 (freedom protects “hate speech”). 
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Pursuant to section 1, the state has been able to uphold significant 
content-based restrictions in a variety of contexts.69
The reasonable limits provision allows a measure of deference to 
Canadian legislatures, but a second key feature of the Charter cuts the 
opposite way.  Section 33, the “notwithstanding clause,” authorizes both 
the Federal Parliament and provincial legislatures to legislate 
“notwithstanding” some (but not all) Charter rights—to pass ordinary 
legislation that applies regardless of those Charter rights.70  This clause 
was crucial to the passage of the Charter.  The provinces insisted on it as 
the price of their consent to the package of constitutional amendments 
that included the Charter,71 but it has not proven to be the provision that 
either its proponents assumed or its opponents feared. 
 69. So, for example, the criminalization of obscene material and hate speech has 
been upheld.  See Butler, [1992] 1 S.C.R. at 497; Keegstra, [1990] 3 S.C.R. at 786. 
 70. Section 33 of the Charter provides as follows: 
(1) Parliament or the legislature of a province may expressly declare in an Act 
of Parliament or of the legislature, as the case may be, that the Act or a 
provision thereof shall operate notwithstanding a provision included in 
section 2 or sections 7 to 15 of this Charter. 
(2) An Act or a provision of an Act in respect of which a declaration made 
under this section is in effect shall have such operation as it would have 
but for the provision of this Charter referred to in the declaration. 
(3) A declaration made under subsection (1) shall cease to have effect five 
years after it comes into force or on such earlier date as may be specified 
in the declaration. 
(4) Parliament or the legislature of a province may re-enact a declaration 
made under subsection (1). 
(5) Subsection (3) applies in respect of a re-enactment made under subsection 
(4). 
Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 33. 
For a variety of views on section 33, see Jamie Cameron, The Charter’s Legislative 
Override: Feat or Figment of the Constitutional Imagination?, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN 
THE CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 135; Janet L. Hiebert, Is it Too Late to Rehabilitate 
Canada’s Notwithstanding Clause?, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA, supra 
note 8, at 169; Tsvi Kahana, What Makes for a Good Use of the Notwithstanding 
Mechanism?, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 191; Howard 
Leeson, Section 33, The Notwithstanding Clause: A Paper Tiger?, in JUDICIAL POWER 
AND CANADIAN DEMOCRACY 297 (Paul Howe & Peter H. Russell eds., 2001); Peter H. 
Russell, Standing Up for Notwithstanding, 29 ALTA L. REV. 293 (1991); John D. Whyte, 
On Not Standing for Notwithstanding, 28 ALTA. L. REV 347 (1990).  Based on his 
concern about the power of the U.S. Supreme Court, Robert Bork’s suggestion that 
consideration be given to amending the U.S. Constitution to establish a congressional 
override in ROBERT H. BORK, SLOUCHING TOWARDS GOMORRAH 117-20 (1996), was 
widely criticized. 
 71. Nine of ten Canadian provinces ended up consenting.  Quebec did not agree 
to the 1982 repatriation (from the United Kingdom) of the Canadian Constitution nor 
to the addition of the Charter of Rights.  Indeed, Quebec has never formally signed on 




Section 33 was designed to overcome concerns about empowering the 
judiciary to override the decisions of the legislature, but it addresses this 
concern only to a limited extent.  By invoking this provision Canadian 
legislatures can suspend the effect of judicial decisions interpreting some 
Charter rights for nonretroactive,72 renewable five-year periods.73  The 
automatic expiry of a notwithstanding declaration means that the default 
position is judicial supremacy in interpreting the Charter. 
The notwithstanding clause is often relied on by those who argue that 
the Charter establishes a weaker form of judicial review than the U.S. 
Bill of Rights because it denies courts the last word as to the meaning of 
Charter rights.  However, things are not what they seem.  The notwithstanding 
clause has never been used by the Federal Parliament—not one single 
time—and has been disavowed by successive Prime Ministers since the 
Charter was passed. Its use has come to be seen as undermining the 
Charter, in part because judicial decisions interpreting the Charter have 
come to be seen as synonymous with the Charter itself.74  Most 
Canadians appear to have accepted what many Americans continue to 
contest—the idea that the judiciary is the exclusive interpreter of the 
Constitution, or at any rate the only branch of government whose views 
matter.  Even controversial and unpopular judicial decisions—cases the 
federal government lost in court—have not been reversed by Parliament.  
Indeed, no attempt has even been made to do so, despite the power 
majority governments have in a Westminster parliamentary system.75  
Examples of controversial decisions not overridden include one 
extending the right to an oral hearing to thousands claiming refugee 
status,76 one prohibiting the establishment of limits on tobacco 
advertising,77 one causing thousands of persons charged with crimes to 
be released on the basis that the state had taken too long to try them,78 
to the Canadian Constitution, but it applies in Quebec in any event.  See HOGG, supra 
note 15, § 4.1(c). 
 72. This limitation on the clause was inferred by the Supreme Court of Canada in 
Ford v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), [1988] 2 S.C.R. 712. 
 73. Canadian Charter, supra note 5, § 33(3)-(5).   
 74. See Grant A. Huscroft, “Thank God We’re Here”: Judicial Exclusivity and its 
Consequences, 25 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 241 (2004) (Can.). 
 75. A majority government describes the situation in which the governing political 
party holds a majority of seats in the legislature or parliament.  Strict party discipline, 
which is typical in Westminster parliamentary government, means that all members of 
the governing party almost always support legislation proposed by the government. 
 76. Singh v. Minister of Employment & Immigration, [1985] 1 S.C.R. 177.  The 
decision in Singh has cost the federal government billions of dollars on an ongoing basis. 
 77. RJR-MacDonald, Inc. v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1995] 3 S.C.R. 199 (five-four 
decision). 
 78. R. v. Askov, [1990] 2 S.C.R. 1199. 
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and one establishing same-sex marriage,79 among others.  Thus, the 
decisions of Canadian courts are, in effect, final unless the Court 
changes its mind.80  It is significant that, outside of Quebec (the only 
province that opposed passage of the Canada Act 1982 which entrenched 
the Charter), the notwithstanding clause has only ever been used three 
times by provincial or territorial governments,81 and never to overturn a 
judicial decision.82
Accordingly, the notwithstanding clause is essentially irrelevant as far 
as provincial legislatures and the Federal Parliament are concerned.  But 
it may be highly relevant to courts in interpreting the Charter.  Arguably, 
the notwithstanding clause frees Canadian courts to be less deferential to 
elected legislatures than they otherwise would have been in the absence 
of such a clause, because it allows judges to act on the basis that their 
 79. Halpern v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), 65 O.R.3d 161 (2003).  Not only was this 
Ontario Court of Appeal decision not reversed by legislation, the Government 
capitulated by refusing to appeal to the Supreme Court, then proposing to enact 
legislation to extend the impact of the decision across the country—this only six years 
following Parliament’s earlier affirmation of the traditional definition of marriage.  
Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act, 2000 S.C., ch. 12 (Can.).  The 
Government attempted to avoid political fallout by involving the Supreme Court of 
Canada on an advisory basis, something permitted under Canadian law.  Huscroft, supra 
note 74, at 261 (discussing Government’s strategy).  The Supreme Court of Canada 
refused to advise whether or not the limitation of marriage to opposite-sex couples 
infringed the Charter, however, reasoning that there was no need to do so since the 
Government had not appealed the decision in Halpern and had proposed legislation to 
permit same-sex marriage in any event.  See Reference re Same-Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 
S.C.R. 698. 
 80. Which it does from time to time.  The decision in Askov was softened 
considerably in R. v. Morin, [1992] 1 S.C.R. 771, which is now the leading case on 
section 11(b) of the Charter, the right to be tried within a reasonable time. 
 81. Moreover, these three examples turn out to be irrelevant.  See HOGG, supra note 
11, § 36.2.  Saskatchewan’s use of the notwithstanding clause in 1984 to protect collective 
bargaining legislation was redundant because the Court held that the freedom of association 
did not include the right to strike.  Retail, Wholesale & Dep’t Store Union v. 
Saskatchewan, [1987] 1 S.C.R. 460.  Alberta’s invocation of the notwithstanding clause in 
2000 to preserve the common law definition of marriage is irrelevant given that the 
province does not have constitutional jurisdiction over the status of marriage.  See Same-
Sex Marriage, [2004] 3 S.C.R. 698.  The third case involved territorial legislation that 
included a notwithstanding declaration, but never came into effect.  Land Planning and 
Development Act, 1982 S.Y.T., ch. 22, § 39(1) (not yet in force), cited in HOGG, supra note 
11, § 36.2 n.12a. 
  82. One consequence of judicial exclusivity is that it would appear to create an 
incentive to invoke the notwithstanding clause in order to preempt judicial review, thus 
immunizing the legislation from Charter scrutiny.  See Ford v. Quebec (Att’y Gen.), 
[1988] 2 S.C.R. 712 (precluding the notwithstanding clause from being invoked 
retrospectively creates a similar incentive).  See HOGG, supra note 11, § 36.6. 




decisions are not final.83  Ironically, in other words, section 33 may have 
the unintended consequence of making Canadian judges less deferential 
to legislators than American judges, who decide constitutional cases 
in the knowledge that their decisions can only be overturned by 
constitutional amendment. 
Whether or not this is the case, the fact is that the U.S. Supreme Court 
has developed a number of techniques designed to facilitate judicial 
deference—a more minimalist approach to judicial review—in order to 
minimize the need to answer constitutional questions.  More to the point, 
these techniques are not used by the Supreme Court of Canada to the 
same extent, as we will see below. 
In sum, despite structural differences between the two bills of rights 
and the analytical frameworks that must be used in interpreting and 
applying them, judicial review under the Canadian Charter is similar to 
judicial review under the U.S. Bill of Rights in that both are strong 
forms of judicial review.  Judicial deference is a feature of the 
jurisprudence of both the Supreme Court of Canada and the U.S. 
Supreme Court, but it is unpredictable: structural differences, as well as 
political and cultural differences, may lead to very different results. 
2.  New Zealand and the United Kingdom 
New Zealand and the United Kingdom are jurisdictions with unwritten 
constitutions, meaning that neither country has an overarching document 
that constitutes government and sets out the limits on power and how 
separation is to be maintained.  Both of these jurisdictions, however, do 
have statutory bills of rights that are subject to the ordinary processes of 
amendment.84  Thus, decisions interpreting the rights they protect can, at 
least in theory, be undone by the passage of ordinary legislation.  There 
is no need for the sort of supermajority ordinarily required for a 
constitutional amendment. 
As we noted above, New Zealand’s Bill of Rights came first, and with 
little fanfare. A proposal to adopt a supreme law bill of rights was 
 83. The judiciary sometimes has it both ways in this argument.  In regard to the 
few rights that are not subject to the notwithstanding clause, the Court has claimed that 
heightened scrutiny is warranted as a result.  See, e.g., Sauvé v. Canada (Chief Electoral 
Officer) (Sauvé II), [2002] 3 S.C.R. 519.  One might equally have argued that the 
opposite conclusion is appropriate—that, given the need for a constitutional amendment 
(virtually impossible to obtain) to overturn a judicial decision interpreting rights not 
subject to the notwithstanding clause, judges should be more rather than less deferential 
to the legislature in interpreting those rights. 
 84. The Constitution Act 1986 does some of the work a written constitution would 
in New Zealand, but it is ordinary legislation, and there remains a considerable role for 
unwritten constitutional norms in any event.  See PHILIP A. JOSEPH, CONSTITUTIONAL AND 
ADMINISTRATIVE LAW IN NEW ZEALAND 112-16 (2d ed. 2001). 
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strongly opposed85—ironically, by the New Zealand legal community, 
among others—and in order to pass even a statutory bill of rights it was 
necessary for the government to water down the proposal considerably.  
In particular, a provision was added rendering the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights subordinate to all other legislation in the event of a conflict—that 
is, specifically precluding the courts from holding inconsistent 
legislation of no force or effect, whether the other legislation was passed 
prior to or following the passage of the New Zealand Bill of Rights.86  
Against that, a reading-down provision was included.  It instructs courts 
to interpret other legislation consistently with the protected rights and 
freedoms of the Bill of Rights, if they can.  Only in the event that the 
judges decide they cannot read the other statute’s provisions as 
consistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights must the other legislation 
prevail.  In order to minimize the chances that future inconsistent 
legislation would be passed, a provision was also added requiring the 
Attorney General to report to Parliament whenever proposed legislation 
was thought to be inconsistent with the New Zealand Bill of Rights.87  
The changes were designed to preserve parliamentary sovereignty.  Thus 
the Prime Minister who proposed the bill referred to it as a “parliamentary 
bill of rights.”88
This must seem to American eyes to be as enervated a bill of rights as 
can be imagined.89  In practice, however, it has not worked out that 
 85. The history of the New Zealand Bill of Rights is discussed in RISHWORTH ET 
AL., supra note 11, ch. 1.  See also James Allan, Turning Clark Kent into Superman: The 
New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 9 OTAGO L. REV. 613 (2000). 
 86. Section 4 of the New Zealand Bill of Rights provides as follows: 
No court shall, in relation to any enactment (whether passed or made before or 
after the commencement of this Bill of Rights),— 
(a) Hold any provision of the enactment to be impliedly repealed or revoked, 
or to be in any way invalid or ineffective; or 
(b) Decline to apply any provision of the enactment—by reason only that the 
provision is inconsistent with any provision of this Bill of Rights. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, 1990 S.N.Z. No. 109.  The impact of this 
provision is discussed in RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 126-31. 
 87. The idea here, borrowed from Canadian legislation, is that the legislature is 
unlikely to pass legislation if apprised of its inconsistency.  The flaw in this idea is the 
assumption that questions of consistency with the New Zealand Bill of Rights are 
matters of law amenable to brightline answers that legislators will or should accept.  See 
id., ch. 4. 
 88. 502 PARL. DEB., H.R. (1989) 13038 (N.Z.) (Rt. Hon. Geoffrey Palmer, moving 
introduction of the Bill). 
 89. Justice Brennan, for example, considered that a statutory constitutional bill of 
rights was of little use, and that judicial power to enforce constitutional rights as against 




way.90  The “reasonable limits” provision based on section 1 of the 
Canadian Charter, designed for use with a supreme-law bill of rights 
model rather than a statutory model, was retained.  New Zealand judges 
have used this provision, together with the reading-down provision, in 
creative ways.91  As a result, they are rarely required to conclude that 
another statute’s wording is so plain that it must be read as inconsistent 
with the New Zealand Bill of Rights.  This interpretive power allows 
New Zealand judges to achieve much of what an American judge could 
do under the U.S. Bill of Rights;92 moreover, in the event that an 
interpretive solution is not possible, New Zealand judges have asserted 
that they have not only the power, but also the duty, to issue declarations 
of inconsistency in appropriate circumstances.93
The New Zealand experience suggests that it is a mistake to assume 
that statutory bills of rights necessarily establish a weak form of judicial 
review where legislation is concerned.  Much depends on how far the 
judges are prepared to go in reading down otherwise clear statutory 
language and whether or not the legislature is prepared to respond. 
The New Zealand Bill of Rights was one of the models for the U.K.’s 
Human Rights Act 1998, and in particular for the apparent preservation 
of parliamentary sovereignty.  Like their New Zealand counterparts, 
U.K. judges were denied the power to strike down or invalidate 
legislation for unconstitutionality.  Still, the U.K. Human Rights Act 
includes a reading-down provision similar to that in the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights, requiring courts to interpret legislation consistently with 
the protected rights whenever possible.94  It specifically requires judges to 
issue “declarations of incompatibility when they conclude that another 
the legislature was a prerequisite of meaningful constitutionalism.  See William J. 
Brennan, Jr., The Worldwide Influence of the United States Constitution as a Charter of 
Human Rights, 15 NOVA L. REV. 1 (1991). 
 90. The New Zealand Court of Appeal set the tone for the New Zealand Bill of 
Rights early on by reading-in a remedies provision to cover executive action in breach of 
rights and establishing a public law cause of action for its breach (similar to a Bivens 
action, but much wider in scope).  See Simpson v. Attorney-General (Baigent’s Case), 
[1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667; see also RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 814-31 (discussing 
Baigent’s Case). 
 91. See, e.g., Ministry of Transp. v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260 (C.A.), available 
at 1992 NZLR LEXIS 657 (reading a right to counsel into legislation authorizing 
roadside breath testing). 
 92. Allan, supra note 85; McLean, supra note 56. 
 93. See Moonen v. Film & Literature Bd. of Review, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 9 (C.A.); see 
also RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 833-37.  Subsequently, legislation was passed 
establishing a procedure for obtaining declarations, but only in regard to claims of 
discrimination in breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights.  See id. at 836. 
 94. Human Rights Act, 1998, ch. 42, § 3 (U.K.). 
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statute is inconsistent with the enumerated rights but is sufficiently 
clearly worded that it must be upheld.”95
Too little time has passed since the U.K.’s Human Rights Act has 
come into force to do more than signal how the reading-down provision 
might come to be used.  Consider, however, the recent case of Ghaidan 
v. Mendoza.96  In that case, the House of Lords held that the requirement 
to read-down legislation in order to avoid inconsistency with the Human 
Rights Act enables a court to depart from the unambiguous meaning that 
a piece of legislation would otherwise bear.  Lord Nicholls of 
Birkenhead made the claim in these words: 
It is now generally accepted that the application of section 3 does not depend 
upon the presence of ambiguity in the legislation being interpreted.  Even if, 
construed according to the ordinary principles of interpretation, the meaning of 
the legislation admits of no doubt, section 3 may none the less require the 
legislation to be given a different meaning. . . . 
. . .  Section 3 may require the court to . . . depart from the intention of the 
Parliament which enacted the legislation. . . . 
. . . . 
. . .  It is also apt to require a court to read in words which change the meaning 
of the enacted legislation, so as to make it Convention-compliant [meaning bill 
of rights compliant].97
Lord Steyn agreed that the reading-down provision applies even if there is 
no ambiguity in the statute.  He suggested in clear terms that the 
interpretation adopted need not even be a reasonable one,98 and strongly 
urged that the English courts opt to use this reading-down provision—more 
bluntly, to interpret away any judicially perceived flaws in legislation—as 
the primary remedy and to resort to declarations of incompatibility only in 
exceptional circumstances.  For his part, Lord Rodger adopted a sort of 
“judicial vandalism” test, the implication being that anything short of 
drastic rewriting of legislation is acceptable.99
 95. Id. § 4.  The U.K. Human Rights Act also goes further than the New Zealand 
Bill of Rights by setting out a process empowering the executive branch of government 
to respond to judicial declarations of incompatibility, going so far as to allow the 
ordinary legislative process to be dispensed with on a temporary basis.  Id. § 10. 
 96. Ghaidan v. Godin-Mendoza, [2004] UKHL 30, [2004] 2 A.C. 557 (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 97. Id. at 571-72. 
 98. Id. at 574. 
 99. Id. at 597.  However, as Lord Millett notes in dissent, what the majority does 
in this case looks to many to amount to judicial vandalism.  Id. at 583 (Millet, L., 
dissenting). 




It is crucial to realize that in reaching this result their Lordships 
overruled one of their own House of Lords authorities—a case on the 
meaning of exactly this same statutory provision, an authority only five 
years old, and one that had held the meaning to be clear.100  So the 
potential power of these reading-down provisions should not be 
underestimated.  Even Lord Millett, in dissent, agreed that “even if, 
construed in accordance with ordinary principles of construction, the 
meaning of the legislation admits of no doubt, [section] 3 may require it 
to be given a different meaning.”101  The only constraint he would have 
the judges impose on themselves is that the meaning they give the 
statutory provision be “intellectually defensible.”102  Yet it is important 
to note that he means this not as any very high hurdle to be cleared.  
According to Lord Millett, the court “can read in and read down; it can 
supply missing words, so long as they are consistent with the 
fundamental features of the legislative scheme; it can do considerable 
violence to the language and stretch it almost (but not quite) to breaking 
point.”103
This goes to show that New Zealand and U.K. judges are in something 
of a different position when it comes to rights.  Unlike their American 
counterparts, they cannot “strike down” legislation for inconsistency 
with their bills of rights.  Nevertheless, they have considerable room to 
read-down legislation, arguably to the point of redrafting statutes the 
judges find inconsistent with the indeterminate rights guarantees in their 
statutory bill of rights.104  Use of the reading-down power to redraft 
statutes is not only hard to distinguish from a power to invalidate or 
strike down statutes, as Janet McLean has written, it is also the very 
thing that American courts sometimes do, rather than take the larger step 
of declaring legislation unconstitutional.105
Be this as it may, both the New Zealand and U.K. bills of rights 
include interpretive tools that allow courts to turn ostensibly weak 
judicial review into something much stronger where legislation is 
concerned.  The extent to which judges in those jurisdictions will use 
those tools or will prefer a more cautious approach is an empirical 
 100. See Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Ass’n, [2001] 1 A.C. 27, 33 (H.L.) (appeal 
taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
 101. Ghaidan, [2004] 2 A.C. at 585 (Millett, L., dissenting). 
 102. Id. 
 103. Id. 
 104. Of course, the legislature can respond with a new statute, but that too is then to 
be read by the judges as consistent with the enumerated rights, if possible. 
 105. McLean, supra note 56, at 427-30; see also RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, 
at 124-26 (comparing “as applied” invalidity and “reading down”). 
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question.106  The important point is that judges in both countries interpret 
and apply their bills of rights in the context of parliamentary 
sovereignty—any decision they make can be overturned by a simple 
legislative majority. 
3.  Summary 
We hope that this brief sketch of how rights-based judicial review 
operates in three other common law countries is enough to emphasize 
that great care must be taken in relying on what courts in those and 
other jurisdictions say about rights, however similarly the respective 
rights provisions in their bills of rights may appear to be.  Unlike in the 
United States, it may be that discussions of rights are but a prelude to a 
second-stage discussion focused on considering the extent to which 
particular limitations on rights can be justified.  Similarly, it may be 
that much more of the work of rights-based case law is being done 
under the guise of statutory interpretation, and hence that there is less 
reticence to appeal to rights-based norms.  Nor should one forget that 
judicial decisions in these jurisdictions can, in theory if not necessarily 
in practice, be overcome by passage of ordinary legislation.  For these 
reasons and more, there is every reason to be wary of taking the 
decisions of foreign courts at face value where rights are concerned.107
 106. New Zealand judges breathed life into the New Zealand Bill of Rights under 
the leadership of the President of the Court of Appeal, Sir Robin Cooke.  Prior to passage 
of the Bill of Rights, Cooke had flirted with the idea that judges could invoke common 
law authority to refuse to give effect to legislation that infringed fundamental rights.  See 
Michael Kirby, Lord Cooke and Fundamental Rights, in THE STRUGGLE FOR SIMPLICITY 
IN THE LAW: ESSAYS FOR LORD COOKE OF THORNDON 331 (Paul Rishworth ed., 1997) 
(discussing and criticizing Cooke’s heretical idea).  The Court’s record since Cooke’s 
retirement is mixed.  See Petra Butler, Human Rights and Parliamentary Sovereignty in 
New Zealand, 35 VICT. U. WELLINGTON L. REV. 341 (2004) (arguing that New Zealand 
judges have been careful with their power and generally respected institutional roles).  
But see Allan, supra note 85 (providing an opposite argument).  It is early days in the 
United Kingdom, as we have noted, but the section 3 reading-down provision is proving 
to be an important judicial tool. 
 107. The difficulties involved in understanding the decisions of foreign courts may 
be exacerbated under a regional instrument like the ECHR.  The European Court of 
Human Rights is often required to reconcile competing conceptions of rights from the 
various member states.  The Court applies a “margin of appreciation,” meaning that it 
will often allow a range of interpretations of the protected rights.  The difficulty lies in 
knowing when the margin of appreciation will apply, and to what extent.  See, e.g., 
Handyside v. United Kingdom, 1976 Y.B. Eur. Conv. on H.R. 506.  See generally D.J. 
HARRIS ET AL., LAW OF THE EUROPEAN CONVENTION ON HUMAN RIGHTS 12-15 (1995); 
Timothy H. Jones, The Devaluation of Human Rights Under the European Convention, 




C.  Non-American Conceptions of Judicial Review 
Although Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Marbury in 1803 is 
usually taken as the starting point, it took a considerable amount of time 
for judicial review to become well established in the United States.108  It 
was one thing to assert judicial power to refuse to give effect to laws the 
Court considered unconstitutional, but quite another to exercise that 
power secure in the knowledge that the other branches of government 
would respect the Court’s orders.  The heyday of judicial review did not 
come until the Warren Court and the civil rights movement in the 1950s, 
and viewed in context it was a radical period.  Yet, as many have pointed 
out, this was the period that countries like Canada took as the defining 
period as far as judicial review is concerned.109  Advocates of judicial 
review considered that courts had power to do great good in reforming 
society, and proposed the adoption of bills of rights with progressive 
goals in mind.  Brown v. Board of Education110 is the sort of decision 
that is supposed to be typical: the U.S. Supreme Court is widely 
assumed to have ended racial segregation.  Chief Justice Warren showed 
what courts could do with a bill of rights, and problems with judicial 
review demonstrated by some of the Court’s prior decisions were either 
ignored or supposed to have been precluded by the use of different 
language to define rights in more modern bills of rights. 
It is important to pause here to emphasize the extent to which the 
American conception of judicial review differs from that of other 
countries with bills of rights.  To start, the U.S. Supreme Court’s role is 
constitutionally limited; it may pronounce only upon actual cases or 
controversies.  Secondly, although judicial review is well established in 
1995 PUB. L. 430 (U.K.); R. St. J. Macdonald, The Margin of Appreciation, in THE 
EUROPEAN SYSTEM FOR THE PROTECTION OF HUMAN RIGHTS 83 (R. St. J. Macdonald, F. 
Matscher & H. Petzold eds., 1993).  Different problems arise in the context of 
interpreting international bills of rights.  To say the least, the decisions of the UNHRC 
interpreting the ICCPR are often sparsely reasoned, consisting of little more than 
recitations of fact and argument, followed by brief conclusions.  See JOSEPH ET AL., supra 
note 51, at 50. 
 108. See Michael W. McConnell, Toward a More Balanced History of the Supreme 
Court, in THAT EMINENT TRIBUNAL: JUDICIAL SUPREMACY AND THE CONSTITUTION 141 
(Christopher Wolfe ed., 2004).  Justice Brennan observed that “the federal courts played 
only a negligible role in protecting civil liberties until almost a century later, in the 
1930s, and most of the progress we have made in America was accomplished within the 
last four decades.” William J. Brennan, Jr., Why Have a Bill of Rights?, 9 OXFORD J. 
LEGAL STUD. 425, 430 (1989). 
 109. Justice L’Heureux-Dubé of the Supreme Court of Canada has acknowledged 
that cases from the 1950s, 60s, 70s, and early 80s—spanning the Warren and Burger 
Courts—have been the most influential, among other reasons, because these Courts 
“attempted to make the principles of their constitution relevant for modern times.”  
L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 15, at 20. 
 110. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
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the United States, its legitimacy is not taken for granted.  As a result, a 
variety of rules and interpretive techniques have been devised over the 
years in an attempt to limit the scope of judicial review, and so respect 
the roles of the other branches of government: standing, mootness, 
ripeness, the Ashwander doctrine, the political questions doctrine, and so 
on.111  To be sure, some of these concepts have foreign analogues, but 
they are understood differently in other jurisdictions, and are in general 
far less significant.  For example, standing requirements tend to be less 
onerous in other common law countries, reflecting the concern that 
constitutional rights not go underenforced.112  Moreover, foreign courts 
are more likely to decide moot cases as a matter of their discretion, 
typically on the basis that the Court’s guidance is needed.  Judges in 
other jurisdictions demonstrate (or sometimes affect) little concern about 
the legitimacy of judicial review, certainly far less than their American 
counterparts.113
For instance, Canadian judges are fond of denying the need to 
legitimate the exercise of their power.  In an early case under the 
Charter, Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act,114 Justice Lamer of the 
Supreme Court of Canada replied to an argument raising concerns about 
the legitimacy of judicial review as follows: 
This is an argument which was heard countless times prior to the entrenchment 
of the Charter but which has in truth, for better or for worse, been settled by the 
very coming into force of the Constitution Act, 1982.  It ought not to be 
forgotten that the historic decision to entrench the Charter in our Constitution 
was taken not by the courts but by the elected representatives of the people of 
Canada.  It was those representatives who extended the scope of constitutional 
adjudication and entrusted the courts with this new and onerous responsibility.  
 111. See generally LOUIS FISHER, CONSTITUTIONAL DIALOGUES: INTERPRETATION AS 
POLITICAL PROCESS 85-116 (1988). 
 112. Standing has been liberalized throughout the English common law world.  See 
HOGG, supra note 11, § 56.2 (discussing standing in Canada); WILLIAM WADE & 
CHRISTOPHER FORSYTHE, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 695-700 (9th ed. 2004) (discussing 
standing in various common law nations).  The concept of a political questions doctrine 
has been considered and rejected in Canada.  See Operation Dismantle v. The Queen, 
[1985] 1 S.C.R. 441; cf. LORNE SOSSIN, BOUNDARIES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW: THE LAW OF 
JUSTICIABILITY IN CANADA 131-200 (1999).  The doctrines of ripeness and mootness 
exist, but there is no “case or controversy” requirement in other jurisdictions, and courts 
are not shy about wading into controversies they consider require judicial resolution. 
Obiter dicta is a prominent feature of decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.  Id. 
 113. Something much larger may be going on as well.  Judicial willingness to 
address constitutional issues may reflect the view that constitutional rights are the 
province of the judiciary, rather than the other branches of government. 
 114. [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486. 




Adjudication under the Charter must be approached free of any lingering 
doubts as to its legitimacy.115
Other members of the Supreme Court of Canada have emphasized that 
they did not ask for the powers the Constitution bestows on them, as 
though they are disinterested parties who are simply required to uphold 
the Charter (as they interpret it).116
But whether or not they are concerned about justifying the exercise of 
their powers, there is no doubt that judges in most common law 
countries tend to regard the interpretation of bills of rights as a task to 
which the judiciary is uniquely suited, even as they acknowledge the 
nonlegal aspects involved in defining rights.  In regard to the New 
Zealand Bill of Rights, the New Zealand Court of Appeal has asserted as 
follows: 
Of necessity value judgments will be involved. . . .  Ultimately, whether the 
limitation in issue can or cannot be demonstrably justified in a free and 
democratic society is a matter of judgment which the Court is obliged to 
make on behalf of the society which it serves and after considering all the 
issues which may have a bearing on the individual case, whether they be 
social, legal, moral, economic, administrative, ethical or otherwise.117
Governments in other countries with bills of rights also tend to 
acquiesce to judicial assertions of authority to an extent that Americans 
do not.  Indeed, they may base important political decisions upon the 
judiciary’s heightened role.  Some courts, like the Supreme Court of 
Canada, have an advisory jurisdiction, allowing the federal government 
to ask hypothetical questions of the Court by means of a reference 
procedure.118  Many of the most important constitutional law cases in 
Canada are in fact decisions on reference questions.  In 1998, the 
Supreme Court of Canada delivered its decision on whether or not the 
province of Quebec could unilaterally separate from Canada, and 
whether there was any right to do so as a matter of international law.  
The Court answered those questions in the negative, and in the course of 
doing so went far beyond the questions asked to deliver an extensive 
decision outlining its view on the fundamental postulates of the 
 115. Id. at 497.  Ironically, “fundamental justice,” the term whose meaning was at 
issue in this case, was chosen for section 7 of the Canadian Charter in order to avoid the 
substantive due process problems of Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905).  The 
Supreme Court of Canada held that it had a substantive component in any event.  B.C. 
Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. at 497. 
 116. See Huscroft, supra note 74. 
 117. Moonen v. Film & Literature Bd. of Review, [2000] 2 N.Z.L.R. 9, 16-17 
(C.A.) (Tipping, J., for the court). 
 118. Provincial governments can ask reference questions of provincial courts of 
appeal, and the decisions on such questions usually end up in the Supreme Court of 
Canada on appeal. 
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Canadian Constitution—principles the Court inferred from the 
Constitution and conferred actionable status upon.119
D. Different Interpretive Theories, Premises, and                        
Conceptions of Rights 
“Living constitutionalism”—the notion that the meaning of 
constitutional rights evolves and changes in accordance with the needs 
of contemporary society—has been embraced by courts in most common 
law countries with bills of rights.  Seminal statements include the “living 
tree” metaphor announced by the Judicial Committee of the Privy 
Council (then the highest court in the British Commonwealth) in 
Edwards v. Attorney General.120  That case, which long predates 
Canada’s adoption of the Charter, established that the Canadian 
Constitution is 
a living tree capable of growth and expansion within its natural limits. . . .  Their 
Lordships do not conceive it to be the duty of this Board—it is certainly not their 
desire—to cut down the provisions of the Act by a narrow and technical 
construction, but rather to give it a large and liberal interpretation . . . .121
 
In Minister of Home Affairs v. Fisher, the Privy Council held that bills of 
rights should be given “a generous interpretation avoiding what has been 
called ‘the austerity of tabulated legalism,’ suitable to give individuals 
the full measure of the fundamental rights and freedoms referred to.” 122  
These sorts of statements were embraced by the Supreme Court of 
Canada early in the life of the Charter.  In Hunter v. Southam, Inc., 
Justice Dickson wrote: 
The task of expounding a constitution is crucially different from that of 
construing a statute.  A statute defines present rights and obligations.  It is easily 
 119. Reference re Secession of Quebec, [1998] 2 S.C.R. 217; see Richard S. Kay, 
The Secession Reference and the Limits of Law, 10 OTAGO L. REV. 327 (2003). 
 120. [1930] A.C. 124 (P.C. 1929) (appeal taken from Can.). 
 121. Id. at 136 (Sankey, L.).  It is interesting to note the similarity of Lord Sankey’s 
remarks to those U.S. Supreme Court Justice Brandeis made in an unpublished draft 
dissenting opinion.  Several years before Lord Sankey’s remarks, Brandeis wrote: “Our 
Constitution is not a strait-jacket.  It is a living organism.  As such it is capable of 
growth—of expansion and of adaptation to new conditions.”  BICKEL, supra note 43, at 
106-07.  Chief Justice Taft requested that he remove those remarks from the opinion: 
“[T]hey are certain to be used to support views that I could not subscribe to.  Their 
importance depends, as old Jack Bunsby used to say, on their application, and I fear that 
you and I might differ as to their application.”  Id. at 108. 
 122. [1980] A.C. 319, 328 (P.C. 1979) (appeal taken from Berm.). 




enacted and as easily repealed.  A constitution, by contrast, is drafted with an 
eye to the future.  Its function is to provide a continuing framework for the 
legitimate exercise of governmental power and, when joined by a Bill or a 
Charter of Rights, for the unremitting protection of individual rights and 
liberties.  Once enacted, its provisions cannot easily be repealed or amended.  It 
must, therefore, be capable of growth and development over time to meet new 
social, political and historical realities often unimagined by its framers.  The 
judiciary is the guardian of the constitution and must, in interpreting its 
provisions, bear these considerations in mind.123
It is ironic that originalism was so quickly rejected in Canada, given 
how much easier it would have been for judges to engage in the sort of 
interpretive enterprise that it requires—easier, that is, than with the U.S. 
Bill of Rights, which is so much older.  Nevertheless, progressive 
interpretation of the sort envisaged in Southam is largely uncontroversial 
today in Canada.124
Judges from other countries with bills of rights have made similar 
statements.125  For example, President Cooke of the New Zealand Court 
of Appeal insisted that the New Zealand Bill of Rights there be 
interpreted in a way that “keep[s] pace with civilization.”126 Similarly, 
 123. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145, 155. 
 124. Ian Binnie, Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent, CONSTITUTIONALISM 
IN THE CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 345 (Justice Binnie, of the Supreme Court of Canada, 
discussing the Canadian rejection of originalism); cf. Huscroft, supra note 8. 
 125. The Privy Council, which remains the highest court for a few British 
Commonwealth countries, set out the following interpretive approach in Reyes v. The 
Queen, [2002] UKPC 11, [2002] 2 A.C. 235 (appeal taken from Belize): 
[T]he court must begin its task of constitutional interpretation by carefully 
considering the language used in the Constitution.  But it does not treat the 
language of the Constitution as if it were found in a will or a deed or a 
charterparty.  A generous and purposive interpretation is to be given to 
constitutional provisions protecting human rights.  The court has no licence to 
read its own predilections and moral values into the Constitution, but it is 
required to consider the substance of the fundamental right at issue and ensure 
contemporary protection of that right in the light of evolving standards of 
decency that mark the progress of a maturing society . . . . 
Id. at 246 (citing Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 101 (1958)). 
Justice Kirby of the High Court of Australia, where there is not even a bill of rights to 
interpret, has urged the use of an interpretive technique that ensures the Constitution is 
“constantly evolving.”  See Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, available at 
2004 WL 1747386, at *623.  Although Australia has no State or Commonwealth bill of 
rights, the judges have sometimes read in “implied rights.”  See, e.g., Lange v. Austl. 
Broad. Corp. (1997) 145 A.L.R. 96; Theophanous v. Herald Weekly Times Ltd. (1994) 
182 C.L.R. 104; Austl. Capital Television Pty. Ltd. v. Commonwealth (1992) 177 C.L.R. 
106; Nationwide News Pty. Ltd. v. Wills (1992) 177 C.L.R. 1; see also Michael Kirby, 
Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent: A Form of Ancestor Worship?, 24 
MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 1 (2000) (rejecting originalism); Jeffrey Goldsworthy, 
Interpreting the Constitution in its Second Century, 24 MELBOURNE U. L. REV. 677 
(2000) (replying to Kirby’s views). 
 126. Ministry of Transp. v. Noort, [1992] 3 N.Z.L.R. 260, 271 (C.A.), available at 
1992 NZLR LEXIS 657, at *35. 
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Justice Barak, President of the Supreme Court of Israel, has endorsed 
Justice Dickson’s above remarks from Southam:127
Resort to the ultimate purpose of a constitution allows the constitution to 
address life’s changing realities.  At the founding of the constitution, its authors 
lay a basis for the document that is intended to exercise control over the future.  
This control—lest it become mastery—must be flexible enough to allow 
development.  That is the meaning of the metaphor, “a living constitution.”  Its 
life is not expressed in imposing old constitutional principles on new 
circumstances.  The aliveness of a constitution means giving modern content to 
old constitutional principles.  That is also the meaning behind the metaphor 
comparing a constitution to a living tree.128
These sorts of statements presume a controversial understanding of 
what it means to have a constitution.  For example, Justice Barak 
describes a constitution as “sit[ting] at the top of the normative pyramid.  
It shapes the character of society and its aspirations . . . .  It is at once 
philosophy, politics, society, and law.”129  That being so, one might 
wonder what it is that makes constitutional interpretation a job for 
judges.  The larger problem, however, is that these statements all appear 
to overlook the role of the elected branch of government in facilitating 
change.  It is as though bills of rights must cover everything—absolutely 
everything—that may arise, through the process of evolutionary 
interpretation.130
Progressive interpretation suggests ever-expanding conceptions of 
rights, but clearly there must be, and are, limits to the courts’ interpretive 
generosity.  Judges in progressive interpretation jurisdictions invariably 
value things other than rights—things such as ameliorative welfare state 
policies—and need to make allowances in order to protect them from 
individual rights.  Early in the life of the Canadian Charter, Chief Justice 
Dickson did just this, holding that although the Charter was to be 
interpreted generously and progressively, courts were not to allow 
Charter rights to be used to undermine progressive social policies.  In R. 
 127. [1984] 2 S.C.R. 145. 
 128. AHARON BARAK, PURPOSIVE INTERPRETATION IN LAW 390 (Sari Bashi trans., 
2005) (citations omitted). 
 129. Id. at 370 (citation omitted); cf. Frederick Schauer, Judicial Supremacy and the 
Modest Constitution, 92 CAL. L. REV. 1045 (2004). 
 130. One of us has written at length about the problems with this sort of vision of 
judicial review and bills of rights.  See Huscroft, supra note 8, at 424-27.  The other of us 
has made more general arguments against this sort of interpretive approach.  See James 
Allan, Constitutional Interpretation v. Statutory Interpretation: Understanding the 
Attractions of ‘Original Intent’, 6 LEGAL THEORY 109 (2000). 




v. Edwards Books & Art Ltd., he wrote: “In interpreting and applying the 
Charter I believe that the courts must be cautious to ensure that it does 
not simply become an instrument of better situated individuals to roll 
back legislation which has as its object the improvement of the condition 
of less advantaged persons.” 131
There is a contradiction here that is not easily reconciled.  After all, it 
is usually supposed that rights protect individual interests regardless of 
the situation of the rights holder.  Even assuming that it were 
uncontroversial who the “better situated” and the “less advantaged” are, 
the notion that rights should have less purchase when they conflict with 
socially progressive legislation seriously undermines many rationales 
used to justify and defend rights; it also sets the judges up as 
unchallengeable determiners of what counts as socially progressive. 
Consider the treatment of free speech rights in the United States and 
elsewhere.  In the United States, robust First Amendment protection results 
in the protection of speech many Americans consider to be offensive at best, 
and harmful at worst—everything from flag burning to hate speech and 
pornography—a degree of protection for speech not seen anywhere else.  
The views of theorists like Catherine MacKinnon—considered radical and 
rejected in American constitutional law132—are accepted to varying degrees 
in many other countries with bills of rights.  Indeed, the major free speech 
cases come out differently in the United States than in most other common 
law countries.  Compare American Booksellers Ass’n v. Hudnut133 with R. v. 
Butler134 (a Canadian case upholding criminal law prohibition on possession 
of obscene materials); R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul135 with R. v. Keegstra136 (a 
Canadian case upholding the criminalization of hate speech); New York 
Times v. Sullivan137 with Hill v. Church of Scientology (a Canadian case 
rejecting the need for reform of defamation law),138 Lange v. Atkinson (a 
New Zealand case making modest reform to defamation law),139 and 
Reynolds v. Times Newspapers Ltd. (a U.K. case also making modest 
reform in the same area).140  Although the Sullivan case has inspired 
arguments aimed at limiting the protection afforded politicians and public 
 131. [1986] 2 S.C.R. 713, 779. 
 132. See, e.g., DANIEL A. FARBER & SUZANNA SHERRY, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE 
RADICAL ASSAULT ON TRUTH IN AMERICAN LAW 40-42 (1997). 
 133. 771 F.2d 323 (7th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 475 U.S. 1001 (1986). 
 134. [1992] 1 S.C.R. 452. 
 135. 505 U.S. 377 (1992). 
 136. [1990] 3 S.C.R. 697. 
 137. 376 U.S. 254 (1964). 
 138. [1995] 2 S.C.R. 1130.  Note that federal legislation criminalizing defamatory 
speech in some circumstances was upheld as a reasonable limit on the freedom of 
expression in R. v. Lucas, [1998] 1 S.C.R. 439. 
 139. [2000] 3 N.Z.L.R. 385 (C.A.). 
 140. [2001] 2 A.C. 127 (H.L.) (appeal taken from Eng.) (U.K.). 
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figures in other countries, invariably courts in those countries conclude that 
reputation deserves greater protection than American law provides.141  
Numerous additional examples could be given in areas like election 
campaign spending,142 openness of trials,143 child pornography,144 and so 
on.  First Amendment case law, a defining feature of American 
constitutional law, is rejected as extreme in many countries with bills of 
rights. 
The U.S. approach to freedom of speech is not the only thing that has 
been rejected.  Liberty rights are often given less robust interpretations in 
other countries.  For example, in Kyllo v. United States the U.S. Supreme 
Court held unconstitutional a thermal imaging search under the Fourth 
Amendment,145 but in R. v. Tessling the Supreme Court of Canada 
unanimously held that thermal imaging did not constitute an unreasonable 
search and seizure under the Charter.146  By contrast, when it comes to 
equality the highest courts in other countries are likely to provide a far 
more expansive interpretation than the U.S. Supreme Court, whose formal 
equality approach is usually deprecated.  In countries like Canada and 
 141. The most protection for reputation, and hence the least for freedom of 
expression, is provided in Canada.  (Australia, without a bill of rights, provides more 
protection for freedom of expression.)  See Symposium, A Symposium on Defamation 
and Political Expression, 2000 N.Z. L. REV. 385 (including articles by John Burrows, 
Michael Gillooly, Rosemary Tobin & Geoff McLay).  See generally HOGG, supra note 
11, § 40.10; IAN LOVELAND, POLITICAL LIBELS: A COMPARATIVE STUDY (2000); 
Adrienne Stone & George Williams, Freedom of Speech and Defamation: Developments 
in the Common Law World, 26 MONASH U. L. REV. 362 (2000). 
 142. Compare Harper v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [2004] 1 S.C.R. 827 (holding that 
third party election spending limits did not unconstitutionally limit freedom of 
expression) with Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1 (1976) (finding that certain parts of the 
Federal Elections Campaign Act violated candidates’ rights to free speech). 
 143. Compare Neb. Press Ass’n v. Stuart, 427 U.S. 539 (1976) (reversing order 
limiting the publication of trial facts because order violated right to free press) with 
Gisborne Herald Co. Ltd. v. Solicitor-General, [1995] 3 N.Z.L.R. 563 (C.A.) (holding 
that trial considerations outweighed right to freedom of expression).  The Canadian 
approach is more similar to the American.  See Dagenais v. Can. Broad. Corp., [1994] 3 
S.C.R. 835 (declaring publication ban on trial facts unconstitutional under Canadian 
Charter). 
 144. Compare R. v. Sharpe, [2001] 1 S.C.R. 45 (holding restrictions on child 
pornography to be constitutional) with Ashcroft v. Free Speech Coal., 535 U.S. 234 
(2002) (declaring ban on virtual child pornography unconstitutional because overbroad 
in restricting freedom of speech). 
 145. 533 U.S. 27 (2001). 
 146. [2004] 3 S.C.R. 432.  Ironically, the Court’s unanimous judgment was written 
by Justice Binnie, a leading proponent of progressive interpretation.  See Ian Binnie, 
Constitutional Interpretation and Original Intent, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE CHARTER 
ERA, supra note 8, at 345. 




South Africa, “substantive equality”—equality of outcome rather than 
equality of opportunity and the like treatment of similarly-situated 
individuals—is the rule, at least nominally.  Equality rights are generally 
understood as protecting the disadvantaged, who may be defined having 
regard to membership in a particular group on the basis of inherent 
characteristics.  Limits on the rights of those considered “advantaged” 
may not be considered a violation of equality rights at all.147  Where 
equality rights are found to be infringed, however, the infringement is less 
likely to be held to be justified than limits on liberty rights. 
None of this should come as any surprise, given the inherent 
contestability of rights and the way in which understandings are shaped 
by culture and history.  Indeed, concepts like freedom of speech and 
equality are embraced by so many because commitment to them requires 
so little consensus as to detail.  Agreement at the level of moral 
abstraction allows widespread disagreement and dissensus down at the 
level of drawing difficult social policy lines to be finessed.  Hence any 
country might cherish these rights and regard them as fundamental, all 
the while affording them a different degree of protection.  That is just the 
nature of rights: they are proclaimed at the level of abstract, indeterminate 
generalities to which all, or nearly all, can assent.  Yet these same rights 
guarantees play out and have real effect down in the Waldronian 
quagmire of detail,148 where lines are drawn in highly (and often hotly) 
contested and debatable social policy areas in which there is neither 
political nor legal consensus as to where those lines should be drawn.  
Rights-based constitutionalism is about empowering judges to draw 
debatable, contentious lines down in that quagmire of detail on the basis 
of largely indeterminate rights that command almost universal approval 
and endorsement up in the Olympian heights of moral abstractions.  It 
should come as no surprise, then, that the American approach to hate 
speech differs from the Canadian one, and that people on both sides of 
the issue are convinced not only of the rightness of their own positions, 
but of their commitment to the protection of rights. 
 147. See, e.g., President of S. Afr. v. Hugo, 1997 (6) BCLR 708 (CC) (male parents 
denied pardon given female parents); Weatherall v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 
872 (male inmates denied privacy rights from opposite sex guards accorded female 
inmates); see also Grant Huscroft, Discrimination, Dignity, and the Limits of Equality, 9 
OTAGO L. REV. 697 (2000). 
 148. See JEREMY WALDRON, LAW AND DISAGREEMENT (1999); Jeremy Waldron, A 
Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 13 OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 18 (1993); see 
also James Allan, Bills of Rights and Judicial Power—A Liberal’s Quandary, 16 
OXFORD J. LEGAL STUD. 337 (1996); James Allan, Rights, Paternalism, Constitutions 
and Judges, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 29.   
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Accordingly, the constitutionalization of rights proceeds, in our view, 
in spite of differences as to where lines must be drawn for particular 
rights and, relatedly, in spite of interpretive differences across countries. 
III.  PART II—TO HAVE DOUBTED ONE’S OWN FIRST PRINCIPLES:149 
REVISITING THE DEFENCE OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 
In this second part we propose to set out the main theoretical 
arguments employed to justify the transfer of power to unelected judges 
under bills of rights—arguments used to attempt to rebut the 
countermajoritarian critique.  Our goal here is not to mount a theoretical 
attack on (or defence of) any of these rationales, though we may refer 
the reader to instances of both on occasion.  Rather, our goal is to 
enunciate the rationales in a way that makes it clearer whether, or to 
what extent, they justify internationalism in interpreting the U.S. Bill of 
Rights. 
A.  The Sirens Argument 
The claim here is that bills of rights provide a sort of insurance, by 
which people choose—democratically and in advance—to minimize the 
possibility that legislation may be passed under the distorting influence of 
panic, fear, or anger.  Responsibility for the protection of enumerated 
rights, approved by the people or by their representatives, is handed over 
to an independent, unelected judiciary, in the hope that that branch of 
government is more resistant to panic, fear, and anger and so more likely 
to keep its head in times of perceived crisis.  The usual analogy here is to 
Ulysses tying himself to the mast of his ship in order to avoid the 
temptation of the Sirens’ beguiling song.150  Knowing our potential for 
moral weakness in the future—the possibility of punishing the exercise of 
free speech when we disagree with the content of the speech, say, or of 
clamping down on religious views with which a majority disagrees—we 
 149. This subtitle deliberately echoes Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes’s well known 
maxim: “To have doubted one’s own first principles is the mark of a civilized man.”  
Oliver Wendell Holmes, Ideals and Doubts, 10 ILL. L. REV. 1, 3 (1915). 
 150. For an analysis of the philosophical merits (or more accurately lack of merits) 
of this analogy see Jeremy Waldron, A Right-Based Critique of Constitutional Rights, 
supra note 148, at 47, and Jeremy Waldron, Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review, 13 
LAW & PHIL. 27, 36-37 (1994). 




entrust certain decisions to others. We “tie ourselves to the mast” so that 
the ship of state is not tempted by majoritarian impulse. 
As an argument to justify the power of an unelected judiciary the 
Sirens Argument is premised on a sort of compact or bargain-type 
thinking, albeit a notional one.  The judges are acting as the agents or 
delegates of the people and of the people’s representatives enforcing 
second-order constraints on their first-order preferences, but constraints 
the people (or an earlier generation of people) have chosen to place on 
themselves.  To make the point in more modern terms, it is as though the 
people arrived at a cocktail party and handed over their car keys to the 
judiciary, instructing them not to return the keys if too much alcohol is 
consumed. 
In our view, the Sirens rationale is more persuasively available in the 
context of domestic rights guarantees than international ones.  Whatever 
other flaws or strengths this justification for increased judicial power 
might have, it requires the people (at some point in time) specifically to 
have consented to some set of constitutionalized rights and to have 
handed over interpretation and oversight of those rights to their judicial 
host. 
Where rights-based norms, standards, and line-drawing answers come 
from the decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals, it is hard 
to see how the American people and their elected representatives can be 
said to have consented to the importation of these standards.151  Imagine 
that you handed your car keys over to a host in a jurisdiction in which 
the blood alcohol upper limit is 0.08 and she decides, on her own 
initiative, that an upper limit of, say, 0.03 (in line with that of country X 
or Y) is morally preferable.  When you turn up at the end of the party 
with a blood alcohol reading of 0.04, she refuses to return your keys. 
Now, on the merits of what is the best or most sensible approach to 
drinking and driving, this host—who draws on international and 
comparative norms—may be well be right.  But that substantive issue is 
irrelevant to defending the host’s power on the basis of the Sirens 
Argument.  The people agreed to have judges oversee a 0.08 limit, 
period.  The view of foreign hosts is simply irrelevant. 
Notice, too, that this problem of relying on a Sirens Argument rationale 
cannot easily be sidestepped by moving from the relative objectivity of 
numbers to a more morally overlain concept such as “drunkenness.”  
Suppose that your keys are to be returned unless you are drunk.  That was 
the earlier agreement, the basis on which you gave the host the power to 
 151. In other jurisdictions, however, it is possible that the people may have given 
their consent to the importation of these standards.  See supra text accompanying notes 
18-20 (discussing New Zealand, South Africa, and the United Kingdom). 
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control your keys.  The concept of drunkenness, however, is relatively 
indeterminate.  There is a large penumbra of doubt or uncertainty152 over 
what qualifies. There is also an ambiguity.  Was the host to enforce the 
prevailing standard of drunkenness in the United States at the time of the 
party, or was she to enforce some other view—even one from abroad or 
inspired by international practice—if she thinks it to be a better view? 
The latter option, when tied explicitly to the bargain-type thinking 
underlying a Sirens Argument, is only persuasive to the extent one 
believes it reflects the deal that was entered into at the time of being tied 
to the mast.  One needs to be persuaded that this was the intention of 
those entering into the bargain.  In other words, did those who adopted 
the U.S. Bill of Rights seek to have these moral issues determined on the 
basis of what were the prevailing standards in other countries?  This 
seems highly implausible. 
A more plausible alternative may be to picture the Ulysses bargain as 
allowing the host to enforce her own best moral view of what counts as 
drunkenness.  This is to take the well-known Dworkinian line that the 
moral terms in a bill of rights were intended to be handed over to 
unelected judges for them to give their best moral understanding of the 
concepts.153  On this view, the adopters knew and intended that the 
understanding of these terms would change over time, progressing as 
society’s understanding of drunkenness developed and advanced. 
For our purposes, however, the point is not whether one finds that sort 
of progressive approach to interpretation attractive.154  The point is that 
it is not easily connected to the Sirens Argument.  It works if, and only 
if, you really did instruct the host to apply her own moral standard of 
drunkenness, and you were prepared for her standard to be informed or 
influenced by foreign standards.  Recall, of course, that your decision to 
 152. This is the metaphor made famous by H.L.A. HART in his THE CONCEPT OF 
LAW (1961) (discussing “penumbra of uncertainty,” id. at 131, and “penumbra of doubt,” 
id. at 119). 
 153. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, The Forum of Principle, in A MATTER OF 
PRINCIPLE 53-57 (1985); RONALD DWORKIN, FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF 
THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (1996); Ronald Dworkin, Comment, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW 115 (Amy Guttman ed., 1997).  For a 
full argument on the extent to which Dworkin can be understood as an originalist (in the 
above sense), see Jeffrey Goldsworthy, Dworkin as an Originalist, 17 CONST. COMMENT. 
49 (2000). 
 154. Context matters here.  It may not be attractive, but it may nevertheless be 
legitimate if it were agreed upon in adopting the rights guarantee in the first place.  See 
Allan, supra note 130. 




hand over the keys to someone else was motivated by the fear of moral 
weakness on your own part. 
The issue, then, is how far one can stretch the notion of a bargain in 
which one seeks to bolster his or her own potential moral weakness.  
How far can the notion of asking the host to enforce her own moral 
views of drunkenness be stretched before it collapses into an explicit 
bargain to enforce foreign moral standards?  Clearly there is some room 
for stretch here, but perhaps not as much as is sometimes assumed.  It 
seems plausible to suppose that most people entering into a Ulysses-type 
bargain would want either some sort of idea of the standards being 
brought to bear (meaning originalism of some sort or other) or some sort 
of idea of whose views would count.  They will not fear their own moral 
weakness more than they fear the moral weakness of every other person 
or group.  There will be limits to their willingness to have others’ views 
preferred to their own.  They may well be content to hand the decision 
over to this host, or to American judges in the future.  Equally, however, 
they may well balk at foreign or international moral standards being 
determinative, or even relevant, even if such standards only become 
determinative because this host or this U.S. judge thinks them to be good 
standards.  At that point the Sirens rationale has been stretched 
dangerously thin. 
It bears repeating, nonetheless, that this is not to say that such an 
approach to interpretation is not a good one; it is simply to say that, 
when it is tied explicitly to the bargain-type thinking of the Sirens 
rationale, the connection becomes somewhat tenuous. 
It follows that American judges who appeal to international and 
comparative rights-based case law for authority to override the will of 
the American people are likely to require some further justification 
beyond a Sirens-type argument.155
B.  The Constitutional Argument 
The assertion here, not unrelated to the Sirens Argument, is that written 
constitutions, and so any standard bill of rights they contain, are a way to 
lock in and make difficult to alter particular outcomes—outcomes that 
 155. The Sirens example may pose different sorts of problems depending upon the 
nature of the rights guarantee in question.  It should not be supposed that the 
international community will always adopt more progressive or more generous 
interpretations that have the effect of broadening the scope of a right.  Indeed it may be 
that the international community is less sympathetic to some rights than others.  Property 
rights, for example, may well be subject to narrower interpretations outside the United 
States, and reliance on international authority in this regard would have the effect of 
limiting rights rather than broadening them.  In these circumstances, the judges 
themselves may be vulnerable to the Sirens’ song the people sought to avoid. 
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appear to be just and appropriate at the time the constitution is drafted.  As 
Justice Scalia has put it: 
It certainly cannot be said that a constitution naturally suggests changeability; to 
the contrary, its whole purpose is to prevent change—to embed certain rights in 
such a manner that future generations cannot readily take them away.  A society 
that adopts a bill of rights is skeptical that “evolving standards of decency” 
always “mark progress,” and that societies always “mature” as opposed to 
rot.156
Put differently, constitutions are a better bet than what Larry Alexander 
has described as “the vicissitudes of democratic politics.”157  “We may 
believe that we have the best rules we can ever have, and that there is far 
more danger of loss of political wisdom and morality or of political 
akrasia than there is danger that wide agreement on better rules will be 
thwarted.”158  In other words, we opt for a constitution and a bill of 
rights because we prefer to risk “rigidity rather than risking security.”159
Our concern here is with the relevance of foreign and international 
case law.  This argument makes it even plainer that the underlying 
justification for allowing the unelected judiciary to void acts of the 
legislature is not applicable to decisions founded on the decisions of 
foreign courts or international tribunals.  It would be odd, to say the 
least, to distrust future American politicians while being sanguine about 
future developments in the courts of other countries, or international 
tribunals (none of which existed, of course, when the U.S. Bill of Rights 
was ratified).  If concern about the vicissitudes of democratic politics 
and the likelihood of mistaken change by American voters explains the 
decision to lock in a set of rights, then calling in aid a foreign elite to, in 
effect, update and alter that set of rights through interpretive processes is 
 156. Antonin Scalia, Common-Law Courts in a Civil-Law System: The Role of 
United States Federal Courts in Interpreting the Constitution and Laws, in A MATTER OF 
INTERPRETATION: FEDERAL COURTS AND THE LAW, supra note 153, at 3, 40-41. 
 157. Larry Alexander, Introduction to CONSTITUTIONALISM: PHILOSOPHICAL 
FOUNDATIONS 1, 8 (Larry Alexander ed., 1998). 
 158. Id. at 2.  Justice Jackson famously referred to the purpose of withdrawing 
certain subjects from the “vicissitudes of political controversy” in West Virginia State 
Board of Education v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943): 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain subjects from the 
vicissitudes of political controversy, to place them beyond the reach of 
majorities and officials and to establish them as legal principles to be applied 
by the courts.  One’s right to life, liberty, and property, to free speech, a free 
press, freedom of worship and assembly, and other fundamental rights may not 
be submitted to vote; they depend on the outcome of no elections. 
 159. Alexander, supra note 157, at 4. 




bizarre.  Constitutionalism designed to preserve, rather than facilitate 
growth or change, is about making things hard to change for everyone; it 
is not about giving an elite body of foreign judges or experts a place in 
the debate about how rights should play out in the United States. 
Thus, this second argument, which we have called the Constitutional 
Argument, also seems applicable only to domestic rights guarantees.  
That said, it gives rise to an interpretation dilemma that must be 
considered.  The dilemma is this: if the Constitutional Argument is 
going to work on its own terms—assuming, in other words, that a 
distrust of future politics is on balance warranted160—then the judges 
have to be prepared to give effect to what appear to be the original 
intentions of the enactors, or the original understandings of the protected 
rights.  They must, as Justice Scalia has put it, treat the U.S. Bill of 
Rights as confirmatory rather than amendatory.161
It is observable, however, that they do not.  The apparent triumph of 
the “living constitution” means that the Constitutional Argument rests on 
questionable empirical foundations even as regards domestic rights 
guarantees.  The more a bill of rights is thought of as a changing, 
evolving document, one that needs to keep pace with changing social 
values (and even with civilized developments elsewhere), the more room 
judges will have to appeal to and incorporate into American law 
developments from other jurisdictions and international law, but also the 
less they will be able to appeal to the Constitutional Argument to justify 
those actions.  (Here we refer to those provisions amenable to expansive 
interpretation, provisions like the Equal Protection and Due Process 
Clauses.) 
Accordingly, the way in which a domestic bill of rights is interpreted 
by a country’s judges may well gut the Constitutional Argument on 
 160. One of us has argued explicitly that it is not warranted.  See JAMES ALLAN, 
SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY: ESSAYS LEGAL AND PHILOSOPHICAL (2002); Allan, supra 
note 61, at 192-94. 
 161. See Antonin Scalia, The Bill of Rights: Confirmation of Extant Freedoms or 
Invitation to Judicial Creation?, in LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 19, 22.  
There need not be a strict dichotomy between confirmatory and amendatory bills of 
rights.  Modern bills of rights may be both confirmatory in some respects and 
amendatory in others, although it is noteworthy that bills of rights are often sold on the 
basis that they are in fact confirmatory, the idea being that they would not change all 
that much.  The New Zealand Bill of Rights is a good example here.  Among other 
things, the White Paper, supra note 18, asserted that, even in entrenched, supreme law 
form, “for the most part it would not control the substance of the law and of the policy 
which would continue to be elaborated in, and administered by, present and future 
parliaments and governments.”  Id. § 4.14.  The White Paper is discussed in Grant 
Huscroft, Rights, Bills of Rights, and the Roles of Courts and Legislatures, in 
LITIGATING RIGHTS, supra note 11, at 3, 5-8.  On the other hand, the South African 
Bill of Rights is obviously more amendatory than confirmatory in nature, in view of 
the apartheid regime it replaced. 
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purely empirical grounds, namely that at the point of application judges 
do not in fact pay much regard to the original intentions or 
understandings of the rights that were chosen to be locked in.  Rather, 
they adapt them to what they, the judges, see as changing social values 
and conditions.  The more this is an accurate description of what is 
happening, the less one can justify any sort of judicial power in terms of 
preferring the potential dangers of rigidity over the potential dangers of 
wise majoritarian actions being stymied today.  “Living constitution” 
interpretive techniques do not threaten rigidity, at least not for the 
judges.  They threaten illegitimate or insufficiently restrained judicial 
power—kritarchy—but certainly not rigidity.  Only the people and their 
elected representatives are locked in under this interpretive approach.162
The decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals are more 
likely to be relevant where a bill of rights is seen as a living, evolving 
instrument and progressive interpretation is favored.  Without more, 
however, such an interpretive approach does not justify the decision to 
empower an unelected judiciary to override the will of the people and 
their elected representatives.  Something more is required, and in the 
case of reliance on rights-based internationalism that something more 
does not seem to flow from the Constitutional Argument, and only very 
weakly from the Sirens Argument. 
Hence, we have still to find a solid rationale applicable to 
internationalism in American courts. 
 162. Given progressive interpretation, it follows that the efforts of those who would 
carefully draft a new bill of rights or an amendment with the idea of correcting a 
perceived “mistake” or inadequacy—perhaps one revealed by the decision of a foreign 
court under a provision in another country’s bill of rights—are largely misguided or 
misplaced.  Putting aside any Waldron-style concerns about the legitimacy of such an 
enterprise, attempts to prescribe or preclude certain interpretive outcomes are likely to 
fail in a constitutional system in which progressive interpretation is orthodox.  For 
instance, Canada’s Charter excluded the term “due process” in order to avoid the U.S. 
Supreme Court’s “substantive due process” case law, only to be stymied a few years 
after passage of the Charter by the Supreme Court of Canada’s decision that the 
alternative term chosen, “principles of fundamental justice,” had substantive as well as 
procedural content.  See Reference re B.C. Motor Vehicle Act, [1985] 2 S.C.R. 486.  
New Zealand avoided the use of the term “equality,” preferring the term 
“discrimination,” in order to minimize interference with social policy, only to find that 
the ostensibly more simple prohibition on discrimination had the same effect.  See 
RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 366-97. 




C.  The “Yes There are Objectively Right Answers” Argument 
Under this heading falls all professions to the effect that disputes 
about rights have mind-independent right answers (the first leg of 
claim), and that unelected judges are in a better position to find those 
right answers than are elected legislators (the second leg of claim).  This 
argument comes in a variety of guises ranging from simple intuitionism, 
to calling in aid “right reason,”163 to the sophisticated, elaborate Dworkinian 
version with its reference to a fictional judge Hercules164 and extensively 
worked out concept of integrity.165
Notice that this argument can succeed only if the first and second legs 
both succeed themselves. Even assuming that mind-independent right 
answers to moral questions (and so, to disputes about the rights in a bill 
of rights) exist, there is no reason to entrust such disputes to judges 
unless they seem better placed “to discover” or “to find” such answers.  
Conversely, and perhaps more obviously, the case for antimajoritarian 
decisionmaking processes appears to diminish if mind-independent 
moral answers and answers about the coverage and ranking of bill of 
rights’ rights do not in fact exist.166
Jeremy Waldron points out that the first leg actually subsumes two 
separate issues, a metaphysical or ontological question and an 
epistemological question.  Even if we assume that mind-independent 
right answers to moral and rights disputes exist, it does not follow that 
human beings have any way of knowing what those right answers are.167  
Indeed, Waldron goes on to argue that in a world of widespread moral 
disagreements and dissensus there is in fact no way to know—nothing 
remotely comparable to finding and testing right answers in the 
empirical, material, scientific world where regularities of like effect 
following like cause are imposed from without on human minds—what 
these assumed to exist moral right answers might be.  If Waldron be 
persuasive, that too erodes the case for antimajoritarian decisionmaking 
processes. 
 163. See, e.g., T.R.S. ALLAN, CONSTITUTIONAL JUSTICE: A LIBERAL THEORY OF THE 
RULE OF LAW 2 (2001). 
 164. See RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105 (1977). 
 165. See, e.g., RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 176-275 (1986). 
 166. Dworkin has latterly come to the conclusion that his legal theories require him 
explicitly to defend this position.  See, e.g., Ronald Dworkin, Objectivity and Truth: 
You’d Better Believe It, 25 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 87, 89 (1996).  One of us has argued that 
Dworkin’s argument there signally fails.  See James Allan, Truth’s Empire—A Reply to 
Ronald Dworkin’s ‘Objectivity and Truth: You’d Better Believe It’, 26 AUSTL. J. LEGAL 
PHIL. 61 (2001), reprinted in SYMPATHY AND ANTIPATHY: ESSAYS LEGAL AND 
PHILOSOPHICAL, supra note 160, ch. 3. 
 167. See Jeremy Waldron, The Irrelevance of Moral Objectivity, in NATURAL LAW 
THEORY 158, 173-75 (Robert P. George ed., 1992). 
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The Right Answer Argument depends, therefore, on strong judicial 
review under a bill of rights being understood as a substantive exercise, 
not as itself a procedural or voting or head-counting exercise.168  Yet here 
at last we have a rationale that is potentially applicable when the decisions 
of foreign courts and international tribunals are relied on by domestic 
judges to overrule the elected branches.  If there be a mind-independently 
right answer to what the ambit and scope of, say, the freedom of speech 
under the First Amendment should be and how it should apply, and if the 
judges know (or are most likely to know) what this answer is, then all of 
us committed to rights should welcome the enunciation and imposition of 
that answer by the judges.  More to the point, we should welcome this 
answer even if American courts, in finding it, need to consider the 
decisions of foreign courts or international tribunals.  The source of the 
rights matters far less than the ‘rightness’ of their application. 
If found convincing, this “Yes There Are Objectively Right Answers” 
Argument would clearly justify and support the transfer of power to 
judges under the U.S. Bill of Rights.  In addition, it would also lend 
support to the use of the decisions of foreign courts and international 
tribunals. 
D.  The “Judicial Process is Superior to the Political                              
Process” Argument 
Legal academics are, in general, unabashedly elitist in preferring 
judicial resolution to political resolution.  A cynic would say that this is 
because judges have proven more likely than legislators to deliver the 
sort of first-order judgments on rights questions they prefer—though that 
answer is given less often in the United States these days.169  Few 
outside the United States suppose that this situation will not continue.  
For many, however, the preference for judicial review reflects 
disrespect, if not disdain, for the democratic process.  Legal academics 
 168. See Waldron, Freeman’s Defense of Judicial Review, supra note 150, at 29-32 
(arguing that such judicial review is at core purely procedural—that is, the 
decisionmaking rule is simply that the most judicial votes wins, whatever the substantive 
merits of competing judgments). 
 169. And hence may possibly explain the enthusiasm of some for interpretation 
outside the Court.  See generally LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE THEMSELVES: POPULAR 
CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004); MARK TUSHNET, TAKING THE 
CONSTITUTION AWAY FROM THE COURTS (1999). 




are less likely to see the value in the democratic process than political 
theorists or philosophers. 
Robert Nagel has written much in this vein.  As he notes, the operation 
of the democratic process invariably involves compromises that fail to 
satisfy the protagonists completely.  They are likely to appear incoherent 
or unprincipled compared with what appear to be principled resolutions 
in a court of law, replete with lengthy statements of reasons (that, 
outside of the constitutional law community, are almost sure to go 
unread).170
It is not surprising that democratic processes are thought by some to 
fare badly when compared to the judicial processes.  After all, judges 
have numerous advantages over politicians.  For example, they are not 
subject to anything remotely like the scrutiny and criticism politicians 
endure from the public and the press on a daily basis.171  Indeed, given 
the power they exercise judges lead a privileged existence: they are 
beholden to no one, and are virtually secure for life in their 
appointments.172
We do not mean to suggest that there is anything inappropriate about 
the independence of the judiciary.  The point is that a variety of 
considerations make it difficult to fairly assess the claim that judicial 
resolution is inherently superior to political resolution as a matter of 
process.  There is little doubt, however, that the judicial process is more 
attractive to most lawyers and legal academics than the political process, 
where lawyers have no special expertise as far as getting elected is 
concerned and only modest advantages in understanding and utilizing 
legislative machinery.  More to the point, in the legislative process 
lawyers cannot insist that issues are resolved on their terms, pursuant to 
the sorts of processes with which they are familiar. 
 170. ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND 
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 119 (1989) (“Compared to the detached, careful 
evaluation of briefs and evidence in light of an explicit, consistent set of legal values that 
is the ideal of the judicial process, the legislative process is a nightmare of irrational 
decision making.”). 
 171. Judges in most other common law countries are not subject to scrutiny prior to 
their appointment.  Nor is their performance once in office subject to invasive scrutiny.  
Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong’s THE BRETHREN: INSIDE THE SUPREME COURT 
(1979), an exposé of the workings of the U.S. Supreme Court, has no counterpart, and 
judicial biographies are rare—and often hagiographic rather than critical in any event.  
See, e.g., ROBERT J. SHARPE & KENT ROACH, BRIAN DICKSON: A JUDGE’S JOURNEY 
(2003); Rande Kostal, Book Review, Shilling for Judges: Brian Dickson and His 
Biographers, 51 MCGILL L.J. (forthcoming 2006). 
 172. Unlike in the United States, where Supreme Court justices serve for life, the 
highest appeal court judges in most other common law countries serve during “good 
behaviour” until fixed retirement ages that vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction.  It is 
almost unheard of for a judge to be removed from office. 
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This point is even more forceful outside the United States.  Americans 
regard the court as a political institution no less than the other branches 
of government, and understand its work in political terms; Canadians, 
New Zealanders, the English, and others are more likely to see the 
courts’ resolution of rights questions in legal rather than political terms.  
Relatedly, American academics often suppose that the judiciary in these 
countries must be apolitical, or at least less political than the American 
federal courts.173
Even assuming an apolitical bench in any comparable country, 
however, this in itself would not go very far in justifying rights-based 
internationalism.  For this fourth argument to justify internationalism it 
is not enough to believe that the judicial process is superior to the 
legislative one in the United States; one also needs to believe that 
foreign or international judicial or quasi-judicial processes are superior 
to the American legislative process.  Whatever the latter’s faults may be 
thought to be, that is unlikely to be a widely held belief. 
This fourth argument seems largely inapplicable to international and 
foreign rights-based law. 
E.  The “Judges Achieve Better Outcomes” Argument 
The assertion here is a straightforward empirical, and indeed utilitarian 
one, not unrelated to the Right Answer Argument outlined above.  It is 
that judges achieve better outcomes than elected legislators.  That alleged 
fact, according to this argument, justifies rights-based constitutionalism.  
Indeed, the assertion is often a point of pride, especially for judges. 
Speaking on the occasion of the twentieth anniversary of the passage of 
the Canadian Charter of Rights, Justice Iacobucci of the Supreme Court 
of Canada asked rhetorically whether Canadians were better off as a 
 173. This is a mistake, in our view, and may be a considerable one at that.  The 
Executive in most common law countries enjoys considerably greater power than 
American presidents when it comes to appointing judges to the highest courts.  In 
Canada, for example, judges are appointed to the highest courts in all of the provinces as 
well as to the Supreme Court of Canada by members of the governing party (the Prime 
Minister and Minister of Justice) without confirmation hearings or approval procedures.   
One political party, the Liberal Party, has been in office for the better part of a 
generation—all but about nine of the last forty-two years—and as a result has appointed 
the vast preponderance of superior court judges sitting in Canada.  It is not surprising to 
find that there is a relative homogeneity of outlook as a result—certainly, there is no 
right-left dichotomy on any Canadian appellate court—but this should not be confused 
with an apolitical outlook. 




result of passage of the Charter.174  He supposed, as only a judge could, 
that politics would have stood still had the Court not effected change 
through its Charter decisions, ignoring the long history of progressive 
legislative change prior to passage of the Charter. 
Putting this problem aside, consider the ways in which judges and 
judicial review might achieve better outcomes than the legislative 
branch.  It is worth remarking that the claimed better consequences—the 
utilitarian benefits of affording the judiciary the last word when it comes 
to various enunciated rights—might be achieved in terms of the welfare 
of certain minority groups or it might result in terms of rights 
themselves.  Hence, the claim might be that particular groups (say, 
African Americans, gays and lesbians, or women) do better—have their 
positions more widely or deeply or intensely improved—under 
unelected judges than elected legislators.  Alternatively, the claim might 
be the more encompassing one that rights themselves, or rights-based 
outcomes, are better protected and more fully realized across the whole 
population where judges are given a powerful say under the U.S. Bill of 
Rights. 
Now obviously this claim is difficult to verify no matter how it is 
couched, since on either account it involves not simply identifying the 
good that may occur—assuming there is agreement on what constitutes a 
good outcome—but weighing it up with the bad.  As Jeremy Waldron 
has observed, that bad includes more than simply the loss to the 
democratic process.175  Cases such as Dred Scott v. Sandford,176 Plessy v. 
Ferguson,177 and Lochner v. New York178 spring to mind on the negative 
side of the ledger. 
In any event, on this sort of argument the source of the rights being 
better protected by the unelected judges does not matter all that much; it 
is the good consequences that matter.  Therefore this argument, should 
one find it persuasive, also provides at least some support to a judiciary 
prepared to rely on rights-based internationalism to gainsay the decisions 
of American legislators. 
 174. Frank Iacobucci, The Charter: Twenty Years Later, 19 SUP. CT. L. REV. 2D 381 
(2003) (Can.). 
 175. See, e.g., Jeremy Waldron, Eisgruber’s House of Lords, 37 U.S.F. L. REV. 89, 
93 (2002); Jeremy Waldron, The Core of the Case Against Judicial Review, 115 YALE 
L.J. (forthcoming 2006). 
 176. 60 U.S. (19 How.) 393 (1857). 
 177. 163 U.S. 537 (1896). 
 178. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
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F.  The Dialogue Argument 
The argument here is that rights-based constitutionalism gives rise to a 
dialogue of sorts between the elected branch of government and the 
unelected judiciary.  On this account, judicial decisions can usually be 
understood as leaving room for a legislative response that allows a 
legislative purpose to be achieved, albeit by different means.  Of course, 
where the particular bill of rights is a statutory one, as in the United 
Kingdom or New Zealand—where judges do not have the power to 
strike down or otherwise refuse to apply legislation they consider 
inconsistent with rights—the dialogue metaphor seems plausible.  
Obversely, where the bill of rights is entrenched with no explicit means 
for the legislature to overrule the judiciary, as it is in the United States, 
the dialogue metaphor appears less plausible. 
Be that as it may, there are overtones here of a separation or balance 
of power type argument.179  In addition to any purported long-term 
benefits from diffusing power (including partly to the judiciary), the 
Dialogue Argument also contains a set of assumptions, some of which 
seem almost Whiggish in the central role they afford to rationality and 
the possibility of better decisionmaking after consultation and debate.  
Hence, a dialogue between the judges and the legislature (over the 
specific content to give to vague, amorphous rights guarantees, over the 
relative ranking and scope of those rights, and over how they should 
relate to other social policy concerns) will lead to better decisions.  
Justice Brennan described the role of an “active judiciary” as 
the calmer, cooler party to a dialogue from which the community benefits over 
time. . . .  To the extent that reason and reflection have any role to play in moral 
judgment and constitutional adjudication—and I believe that their role is 
considerable—the dialogue in which the courts and the legislature engage is a 
salutary one.180
Such a dialogue, according to this argument, leads both parties to think 
again, to compromise, and to reach outcomes together they could not 
have done apart or independently. 
The Dialogue Argument seems to take for granted that the metaphor 
of a “dialogue” is an accurate description of what takes place between 
judiciary and legislature under a bill of rights regime.  In fact, the 
relations and interactions between unelected judges and elected 
 179. See infra Part III.G. 
 180. Brennan, supra note 108, at 433-34. 




legislators may look almost nothing like a dialogue.181  Indeed, attempts 
at dialogue are sometimes met with great hostility from the Court, along 
with an assertion of judicial superiority in interpreting the Constitution, 
as the fate of the Religious Freedom Restoration Act demonstrates.182  
Nevertheless, this Dialogue Argument does give some, albeit rather 
slight, support to the practice of referring to international jurisprudence 
on rights questions.  If we are talking about a process in which the 
quality of decisionmaking increases together with the level and amount 
of consultation and debate, then presumably the more input the better.  
Of course, the dialogue here would expand beyond the elected branches 
of government and the unelected domestic judiciary to include new 
participants, namely the foreign judges and international officials who 
have pronounced on rights-based claims.  These new participants would 
not be given a full or guaranteed say; their influence would depend on 
whether the domestic judges wished to listen to their views on particular 
rights issues.  Having made that qualification, it is worth noting that the 
same qualification is true of the Dialogue Argument in the domestic 
context.  American judges may listen to American legislators and alter 
and shape their understanding of rights in the light of the views of the 
elected branches.  Then again, they may not; nothing requires that they 
do so.  It all depends on whether the unelected judges are inclined to 
listen, as opposed to “covering their ears, and chanting the mantra: ‘It is 
emphatically the province of the judiciary to say what the law is.’”183
Nevertheless, if found convincing this rationale provides some support 
for rights-based internationalism. 
G.  The Balance of Power Argument 
If it be true that power corrupts, then dividing up that power and 
establishing countervailing checks and balances may seem a wise idea in 
many circumstances.  On this view, bicameralism, with a genuine house 
of review, seems desirable.  Perhaps also federalism.  Why not go the 
whole hog and give significant power (under the aegis of operating a bill 
of rights) to unelected judges?  The claim here, then, is that a bill of 
rights sets up another branch of government that has significant—but not 
 181. Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 
CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 7. 
 182. City of Boerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997) (holding that the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act of 1993, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (2000), was beyond 
congressional power under the Fourteenth Amendment). 
 183. Jeremy Waldron, Some Models of Dialogue, CONSTITUTIONALISM IN THE 
CHARTER ERA, supra note 8, at 7. 
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too great—powers.  Clearly this sort of thinking is at least somewhat 
reflected in the judgment of the Framers of the American Constitution. 
This rationale, however, cannot easily be stretched to encompass the 
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals.  In one sense, of 
course, power can be diffused anywhere.  Yet it is unlikely that a 
majority of Americans would consent (nor did they in fact actually 
consent) to establishing an explicit balancing and checking role for 
judges of foreign courts or members of international tribunals, even if 
that role be only at the discretion of American judges hearing particular 
cases. 
This argument seems to us plausibly applicable only in regard to 
domestic rights guarantees. 
H.  The Tyranny of the Majority Argument 
The spectre of the potential “tyranny of the majority” is often raised as 
justification for the transfer of power from the elected branch of 
government to the judiciary.  Leave aside the fact that any convincing 
weighing up of relative dangers needs to balance the potential threat of 
majority rule and the spectre of a tyranny of the majority against the 
potential threat of minority rule and the spectre of a tyranny of the 
unelected few.  The Tyranny of the Majority Argument seems to 
function simply by claiming that majoritarianism—letting the numbers 
count—comes with too big a price tag; it is too likely to lead to the 
sacrifice of individual rights.  Majority rule needs to be tempered by 
placing in the hands of the judiciary the power to ensure that legislation 
(passed on the basis of representative majoritarianism) can be struck 
down when it is considered by judges to be inconsistent with certain 
enumerated individual rights and that inconsistency is not (again, 
thought by the judges to be) reasonable or defensible. 
The Tyranny of the Majority Argument is a recurring theme in 
constitutionalism, not only in the United States.  Here is an example 
from the extrajudicial writings of Chief Justice McLachlin of the 
Supreme Court of Canada: 
[I]t is wrong to suggest, as some do, that anything that limits what the elected 
majority might wish to do—including judges—is anti-democratic.  This notion 
that Parliamentary democracy resides only in majority rule is both false and 
dangerous.  It is false because, as we have seen, the power of elected officers is 
necessarily limited by the law in a constitutional democracy.  And it is 
dangerous.  It offers no protection against the tyranny of the majority and it 
overlooks the need to accommodate and validate minoritarian views essential to 




long-term democratic stability. . . .  In a pluralistic constitutional democracy, 
majorities are not permitted to impose their moral values, their conception of 
the good life, at the expense of those who do not control political life.  Each 
Canadian is a member of a minority, in one sense or another.  Each of us can 
see, from that perspective, that democratic rule is not the same as majority 
rule.184
Notice the subtle, yet important, suggestion by Chief Justice McLachlin 
that the judiciary is the only branch of government interested in protecting 
rights.  This deprecation of the elected branch of government resonates 
with the public in many countries; the people are only too willing to think 
the worst of politicians, and to presume that legislators are prone to 
excesses.  As Jeremy Waldron has observed, however, criticism of 
democratic majoritarianism overlooks the obvious point that the Court is 
itself a majoritarian institution.  The same hotly contested issues that 
legislators address are faced by judges, and like legislators judges decide 
cases by voting on their outcome.  A five-four decision of the United 
States Supreme Court is as effective as a nine-zero decision in striking 
down legislation that might have been passed by a unanimous legislature. 
Be that as it may, the Tyranny of the Majority Argument is in some 
ways similar to the preceding Balance of Power Argument. The 
difference is this: If you fear majoritarianism and seek to temper it, then 
rights-based norms, standards, and line-drawing answers from foreign 
courts and international tribunals may be seen as yet another useful 
constraint. 
This argument provides some support for rights-based internationalism. 
I.  The “Bills of Rights Change Nothing” Argument 
This is the home of the cynic.  For the cynic, judges operating under the 
U.S. Bill of Rights always have an eye on popular opinion, on what would 
have been the result of democratic decisionmaking.  True, the judges can 
get slightly ahead of, or fall slightly behind, the public mood.  But they are 
unlikely to do so for very long.185  Some cynics therefore see no benefit in 
bills of rights, with the powerful judiciaries they establish.  Others seem to 
see them as roughly equivalent to Roman circuses, a pleasant diversion for 
many and so worth having for that reason, if not for any other. 
This argument seems to work only for domestic rights guarantees.  To 
the extent that it justifies the kind of transfer of power to the judiciary 
that comes with a bill of rights, it fails to do so for rights-based 
 184. Beverley McLachlin, Chief Justice of Canada, Judging, Politics, and Why 
They Must be Kept Separate, Address Before the Canadian Club of Toronto 2 (June 17, 
2003), available at http://www.canadianclub.org/speeches/speech_2926.pdf. 
 185. See Mark Tushnet, Scepticism about Judicial Review: A Perspective from the 
United States, in SCEPTICAL ESSAYS ON HUMAN RIGHTS, supra note 2, at 359, 365. 
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internationalism.  American judges may have an eye on popular opinion 
in the United States, but it is much less credible—in fact downright 
implausible—to assert that foreign rights-based decisionmakers are 
concerned with American public opinion and will not get too far ahead 
of, or fall behind, it.  Indeed, their views may differ greatly, which is 
precisely why some want to import their decisions. 
J.  Summary 
We have outlined the main sorts of arguments commonly used to 
justify the adoption of a bill of rights and the resulting rights-based 
constitutionalism that follows in its wake.  Four of these arguments—the 
Constitutional, Superiority of the Judicial Process, Balance of Power, 
and Cynic’s Arguments—provide no or virtually no support for the use 
of the decisions of foreign courts or international tribunals in American 
courts.  In other words, even if you are inclined to think that these 
arguments are available rationales in the context of domestic rights 
guarantees, they will not help justify appeals to rights-based 
internationalism. 
On the other hand, five of the above arguments—namely, the Sirens, 
Objectively Right Answers, Judges Achieve Better Outcomes, Dialogue, 
and Tyranny of the Majority Arguments—potentially work to varying 
extents in justifying the use of the decisions of foreign courts and 
international tribunals.  In other words, if (and only if) you find these 
arguments persuasive justifications in the context of domestic rights 
guarantees, you will also have grounds to find them so for international 
and comparative law rights guarantees. 
In our view, however, none of these latter five arguments—alone or in 
tandem, and even taking account of the interpretation dilemma—suffices 
to justify the use of foreign and international authority in interpreting the 
U.S. Bill of Rights.  This is the more so if it is accepted that rights-based 
internationalism produces a ratcheting-up effect—that the incentives lie 
far more on the side of increasing the range of situations to which 
indeterminate, amorphous rights guarantees apply, at the expense of 
democratic law making powers. 
Making a brief case for the likelihood of that ratcheting-up effect is 
the object of the third part of this article. 




IV.  PART III—THE RATCHETING-UP EFFECT OF FOREIGN                                                      
AND INTERNATIONAL LAW 
We began in Part I by arguing that the rights-based jurisprudence of 
other common law countries and international tribunals rests on 
distinctly non-American premises and understandings of rights, quite 
apart from clear differences in the various sorts of bills of rights.  
Approaches to the interpretation of rights differ along with judges’ 
perceptions of their role, to say nothing of the background democratic 
institutions and checks and balances.  In the second part, we set out the 
sorts of justifications typically employed in attempts to rebut the 
countermajoritarian difficulty, the seeming illegitimacy of unelected 
judges drawing too many of society’s social policy lines—lines that 
must be drawn when abstract, amorphous rights guarantees have to be 
applied to everything from abortion to euthanasia, hate speech, and 
religious freedom.  We also indicated which of those justifications we 
thought were potentially applicable when it is foreign and international 
rights-based law and norms that are being used to justify the exercise of 
judicial power, noting that there are fewer such plausible justifications 
once it is the views of foreign judges and international experts that are 
being relied upon to gainsay American legislators. 
Our main thesis, as noted at the start of this paper, is simply that 
Americans should be more wary than most when it comes to the 
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals.  As we have 
noted, unlike some who have adopted bills of rights, Americans have 
never agreed that the decisions of foreign courts are or should be 
relevant; they have not empowered their courts to engage in rights-based 
internationalism for domestic purposes.  Nor have they instructed or 
authorized their judges to engage in the sort of global dialogue that 
many jurists suppose to be their duty.186  It is incumbent on proponents 
of rights-based internationalism to make the case for it.  In our view the 
similarities between the U.S. Bill of Rights and other bills of rights are 
insufficient to overcome the considerable differences between American 
and other forms of constitutionalism.  The arguments just outlined and 
elaborated in detail in Parts I and II, above, form the first two branches 
of our case for that conclusion. 
The third and final ground we give for being wary of foreign rights-based 
constitutionalism is the tendency it has to produce a ratcheting-up effect, 
one where judges in each jurisdiction are tempted to draw on the most 
 186. See, e.g., L’Heureux-Dubé, supra note 15, at 40 (“No longer is it appropriate 
to speak of the impact or influence of certain courts on other countries, but rather of the 
place of all courts in the global dialogue on human rights and other common legal 
questions.”). 
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expansive interpretations of judges from other jurisdictions, while almost 
never being tempted to rely on their more restrictive interpretations.  Justice 
Scalia’s critique of this practice is short and to the point: “To invoke alien 
law when it agrees with one’s own thinking, and ignore it otherwise, is not 
reasoned decisionmaking, but sophistry.”187
Consider the New Zealand experience we outlined above, where the 
judges took an enervated, statutory bill of rights—a parliamentary bill of 
rights, according to its sponsor—and in fewer than a dozen years 
conferred quasi-constitutional status upon it, interpreting it in a manner 
more suited to what they thought it should say.  They emphasized the 
reading-down provision; established a power to issue declarations of 
inconsistency; and created a cause of action for breach of rights.188  
Much of this was accomplished by pointing to the decisions of foreign 
courts and international tribunals, and arguing that what bills of rights 
required elsewhere—even bills of rights that were wholly unlike New 
Zealand’s because entrenched and constitutionalized—should also be 
required in New Zealand.  Baigent’s Case189 is perhaps the most obvious 
and egregious example of this tactic of pointing to broader, more 
expansive practices abroad to ratchet-up the practice at home.  In 
Baigent’s Case the New Zealand Court of Appeal (then New Zealand’s 
highest domestic court) drew support from judicial decisions from 
Canada, Ireland, India, the West Indies and more, as well as from 
decisions of the United Nations Human Rights Committee (UNHRC) 
under the ICCPR, in order to create a public law cause of action for 
breach of the New Zealand Bill of Rights, and did so despite the 
deliberate decision of the New Zealand Parliament to omit a remedies 
provision.190
Not all of the New Zealand decisions have been so expansive as regards 
rights, but even the more conservative decisions of New Zealand courts 
make an important point.  For instance, the New Zealand Court of Appeal 
rejected the argument that legislation allowing only opposite-sex marriage 
was inconsistent with the prohibition on discrimination on the ground of 
 187. Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 627 (2005) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 188. See Allan, supra note 85. 
 189. Baigent’s Case, [1994] 3 N.Z.L.R. 667. 
 190. Id.; see James Allan, Speaking with the Tongues of Angels, [1994] 1 N.Z. BILL 
RTS. BULL. 2; J.A. Smillie, The Allure of ‘Rights Talk’: Baigent’s Case in the Court of 
Appeal, 8 OTAGO L. REV. 188 (1994). 




sexual orientation in Quilter v. Attorney General.191  The plaintiffs in that 
case then complained to the UNHRC but the Committee held that the 
ICCPR did not provide a right to same-sex marriage.192  Yet it is 
noteworthy that neither of these decisions features in the recent Canadian 
decisions holding that the opposite-sex requirement in the law of marriage 
violated the Charter.  This is precisely the sort of picking-and-choosing 
that can be expected with internationalism.  In a world of sometimes 
widely-differing decisions and no settled comparative law methodology, 
the normative preferences of the judges hearing particular cases are likely 
to determine whether or not a particular foreign or international precedent 
makes its way into a judicial decision. 
The direction of movement seems to us to be virtually all one way, 
towards recognizing more and more instances in which rights guarantees 
apply—and hence, less and less room for democratic decisionmaking. It 
is rare to find examples of domestic judges pointing to foreign cases or 
the decisions of international tribunals in support of decisions to limit or 
rein in the range or reach of rights. 
The issue of prisoner voting entitlements reinforces this last point. 
Numerous countries including the United States, the United Kingdom, 
Australia, and New Zealand place some sort of restrictions on whether 
and when prisoners can exercise the franchise.193  The same was true in 
Canada, before two decisions of the Supreme Court of Canada.194  In the 
second of those two decisions the Chief Justice of Canada, writing for a 
five Justice majority, dismissed out of hand the approach taken in other 
countries: 
I conclude that denying penitentiary inmates the right to vote is more likely to 
send messages that undermine respect for the law and democracy than 
messages that enhance those values.  The government’s novel political theory 
that would permit elected representatives to disenfranchise a segment of the 
population finds no place in a democracy built upon principles of 
inclusiveness, equality, and citizen participation.  That not all self-proclaimed 
 191. [1998] 1 N.Z.L.R. 523 (C.A.); see RISHWORTH ET AL., supra note 11, at 377-80 
(discussing Quilter). 
 192. Joslin v. New Zealand, Commc’n No. 902/1999, U.N. GAOR Human Rights Comm., 
75th Sess., Supp. No. 40, at 214, U.N. DOC. A/57/40 (Vol. II) (2002), available at http://documents-
dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N02/668/60/img/N0266860.pdf?OpenElement. 
 193.  Many United States jurisdictions restrict or completely deny voting rights to 
prisoners.  See, e.g., CAL. CONST. art. 4, § 2 (no right to vote in prison or on parole); 
COLO. CONST. art. 7, § 10 (no right to vote while in prison).   
 194. In Sauvé v. Canada (Att’y Gen.), [1993] 2 S.C.R. 438, the Supreme Court of 
Canada struck down a blanket ban on prisoner voting.  Later, in Sauvé II, [2002] 3 
S.C.R. 519, in a five-four decision the Supreme Court of Canada struck down a 
legislative compromise taking away the franchise only from those convicted of more 
serious offences. 
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democracies adhere to this conclusion says little about what the Canadian 
vision of democracy embodied in the Charter permits.195
Certainly there was no suggestion that the understandings of rights in 
these other countries lent any support at all to the Canadian Parliament’s 
decision to limit the right to vote. 
“[T]he persuasive force of international law,”196 as Justice Kirby of the 
High Court of Australia calls it, is near to being a one-way street.  
Reliance on it does and will carry with it a ratcheting-up effect; it will 
almost never be used to pare back the scope and ambit of situations that 
rights guarantees are held to protect.  That, in our view, is a third reason 
why Americans should be wary about making use of the rights-based 
decisions of international bodies and foreign courts. 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The idea of constitutionally entrenched rights originated in the United 
States and it has spread widely in the latter half of the twentieth century.  
There is increasing pressure on American judges to heed the human 
rights jurisprudence of foreign courts and international tribunals when 
interpreting the U.S. Bill of Rights.  It is widely assumed that the 
influence of rights-based internationalism is wholly benign and a force 
for good. 
 195. Sauvé II, [2002] 3 S.C.R. at 548 (emphasis added).  The gratuitous reference to 
“self-proclaimed democracies” presumably includes the United States, New Zealand, 
and Australia, all of which are referred to in Justice Gonthier’s dissenting opinion.  Id. at 
588, 591 (Gonthier, J., dissenting). 
 196. Al-Kateb v. Godwin (2004) 219 C.L.R. 562, available at 2004 WL 1747386, 
at *629.  Justice Kirby has written and spoken at length about the internationalization of 
rights-based law, claiming that the “willingness of national constitutional courts to look 
outside their own domestic legal traditions to the elaboration of international, regional 
and other bodies represents a paradigm shift that has happened in municipal law in recent 
years.”  Id. at *627 (citing Canada, Germany, India, New Zealand, and the United 
Kingdom, in addition to the United States).  To his dismay, his approach has not yet been 
adopted in Australia.  Id. at *622.  However, he asserts confidently: “[W]ith every 
respect to those of a contrary view, opinions that seek to cut off contemporary Australian 
law (including constitutional law) from the persuasive force of international law are 
doomed to fail.”  Id. at *629.  Kirby suggests that they will be viewed as notorious 
precedents like Dred Scott, “with a mixture of curiosity and embarrassment.”  Id.; see also 
Justice Michael Kirby, International Law—The Impact on National Constitutions, Lecture 
at the Annual Meeting of the American Society of International Law (Mar. 29, 2005) 
(expanding on his views), available at http://www.asil.org/pdfs/kirbygrotius050401.pdf. 
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We have argued that this assumption, however widespread, is a 
dubious one. Americans have more reasons than others to be especially 
wary about rights-based internationalism. 
The reason for this is not (or not largely) because American 
constitutional law is becoming ever less relevant in other countries with 
bills of rights—though we think that is the case. Nor is it because (or 
largely because) top foreign common law judges face nothing like the 
scrutiny of top U.S. judges when appointed, while international law 
“experts” win their posts via an even more opaque, political trade-off 
reliant process—though that too is true. 
Instead, the three main reasons we have given for counseling wariness 
on the part of Americans when it comes to rights-based internationalism 
are these: First, quite apart from differences in bills of rights and 
understandings of rights across various countries and internationally, the 
very basics of American constitutionalism—the conception of the state 
and its role, the relevance of institutional checks and balances, and so 
on—are not shared internationally, and sometimes differ greatly.  These 
differences combine to create a comparison of apples and oranges.  
When the U.S. Supreme Court considers a decision from a top common 
law court or international tribunal about how an abstract, indeterminately 
phrased right should apply to a concrete and specific issue, it is nothing 
like the situation when it considers its own precedents. 
Our second reason for wariness is that bill of rights adjudication 
takes place against the backdrop of the countermajoritarian difficulty.  
It is one thing—and perhaps in itself a difficult thing—to justify the 
power handed to domestic judges to interpret a domestic bill of rights 
adopted after debate and disagreement and some sort of head 
counting exercise some time in the nation’s past. It is a significantly 
different thing—and we have argued in Part II above a much more 
fraught and dubious thing—to try to justify giving a role to the 
decisions of foreign courts and international tribunals to gainsay 
elected American legislators.  In fact, we have argued that no 
justifications, alone or together, exist to justify American judges 
making use of comparative and international rights-based law to 
trump the American democratic process. 
The third and last main reason for wariness is the likelihood, the 
strong likelihood, of a ratcheting-up effect accompanying any shift to 
greater reliance on foreign precedents.  We think the former will 
certainly attend the latter, and cause an overall diminution of the 
scope for democratic decisionmaking in the United States. 
Comparative constitutional law is a worthwhile exercise in a 
variety of contexts, most obviously in the drafting of constitutions.  
Indeed it is a necessary exercise in interpreting bills of rights in some 
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countries.  However, it has less of a place in interpreting the U.S. Bill 
of Rights than its proponents have established.  America’s top judges 
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